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September 8, 2021 - Comments Off on Digital and Social Transformations in Pakistan During Covid-19

Digital and Social Transformations in Pakistan During Covid-19

Huma was born and bred in Lahore and is currently studying Public Policy at NYU Abu Dhabi with a focus on gender studies and public health.

Introduction and objectives

At the start of the pandemic, the Digital Rights Foundation conducted a survey on the impact of the Covid-19 crisis in Pakistan. This survey was open from March to June 2020. The purpose of the survey was to assess the impact of increased digitisation across the country in wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and take stock of the digital and social transformations as part of this process. Some baseline indicators that the survey aimed to measure were:

  • The access and quality of access respondents had to digital technologies, including but not limited to tech devices such as smartphones, laptops and broadband connections,
  • Understanding of online security and privacy among respondents, including concerns surrounding increased surveillance and tracking mechanisms during the pandemic
  • Usage patterns for technological devices and social media, before and during the pandemic,

Context

In a joint statement in March 2020, the Digital Rights Foundation and BoloBhi expressed the digital gap during the COVID-19 pandemic would exacerbate inequalities and social cleavages. According to the statement, “Internet access in Pakistan stands at around 35 percent, with 78 million broadband and 76 million mobile internet (3/4G) connections.”

According to the Inclusive Internet Index 2021, Pakistan fell into the last quartile of index countries, ranking 90 out of a 100; particularly low on indicators pertaining to affordability, from ranking 76 in 2019, just before the pandemic.

Furthermore, the statement also explained that mobile internet (often the most affordable mode of access) has been shut down in parts of Balochistan and ex-FATA due to generalised security reasons. Even for areas that do have access, internet speed varies based on one’s location. For instance, internet speed in Gilgit-Baltistan is significantly slower than internet speed in urban centers of Punjab and Sindh.

Lastly, the statement also expressed concerns that “lower-income families either do not own digital devices or they are shared by the entire family unit; this means that families with more than one member working from home or students with online classes will be forced to make a choice.”

Methodological Limitations

In light of these, certain limitations of the survey results need to be addressed. Firstly, as the survey was disseminated primarily online, through social media channels, messaging apps, and email, basic access to internet and wifi became a prerequisite for respondents. This left out a large majority of the population that have little to no access to the internet.

Secondly, the dissemination methods also reflect a certain cross section of the population who regularly use and access social media channels of their own accord, since this was the primary means of distribution.

Lastly, this survey was conducted in English and therefore respondents were limited to those who could understand and communicate in English particularly.

Demographic Summary

The geographic distribution of the respondents reflects the pattern of accessibility and digital connectivity expressed by the statement. Inhabitants of Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad and Faisalabad formed the majority of the respondents, with 48, 27, 24 and 11 responses from each city respectively. In total, there were 4 responses from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 1 from Balochistan and none from Gilgit Baltistan.

We received a total of 128 responses to the survey. 71 (55%) respondents identified as females, 54 (41.9%) as males, with 1 gender non-binary individual and 2 respondents preferring not to disclose their gender.

53% of the respondents were between 25-34 years old, with those between 18 - 24 years and 35 - 44 years old forming the next biggest age brackets of respondents (20.3% and 19.5%, respectively). The large majority of our respondents were therefore employed on salary, self-employed or students. As shown below, while a diverse range of incomes were reported, most respondents fell in the middle to upper income brackets.


Survey Results: Major Takeaways

Digital Divide

93.8% of the respondents reported having access to a broadband connection. The eight respondents that do not have access to a broadband connection, all reported using 3G or 4G services.

Nearly all respondents reported having access to 3G and 4G services; however the amount that respondents spent on these services varied widely, as shown in the graph below:

Despite the reported distribution of access to broadband connections and 3G/4G services, a large majority of the respondents reported difficulties and obstacles in connectivity.

55.7% of the respondents reported experiencing weak or no broadband connection once a week. 15.6% of the respondents reported experiencing weak connections once a month, while the rest experienced these not very often or not at all.

54% of respondents felt that a lack of internet infrastructure in their area impacted their ability to participate in class or at work negatively during Covid-19; of these 45.2% of the respondents reported inconsistent connectivity as the main reason.

59.8% of the respondents felt that internet speed, in particular, negatively affected their experience. Of these, 34% felt that the internet speed had actually decreased in their area in the previous one month at the time of the survey.

Nearly 80% of the respondents agreed that the internet should be a public utility during a crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic. 9.4% of the participants argued that while it should be subsidized, it shouldn’t be free.

While by number, the majority (38.9%) of respondents reported that issues faced in accessibility, connectivity and quality did not negatively impact their access to job opportunities or education, it is important to note that nearly all respondents from outside of Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Faisalabad felt that it did. This points to a geographic disparity in access, connectivity and digitisation. Due to the over representation of respondents from more urbanised and digitalised areas of the country, the results of the survey are somewhat skewed.

A Dawn article published in June, 2021 describes the gendered disparities in access to digital technologies: there is a 38 percent gender gap in mobile phone ownership (the highest in South Asia) and a 49 percent gender gap in internet usage. Our study however did not reflect the same disparities, with respondents of all genders self-reporting similar access to technologies, ownership of gadgets, internet usage, and privacy too. This difference owes itself largely to the demographic, especially class, particularities of this study’s respondents.

Nearly 73% of the respondents started working from home completely or at least partially after the advent of the pandemic, the following transformations were also reported in terms of increasing technological devices and internet usage. While this points towards an increasing digitisation of Pakistan, as more and more online services are utilised for what would previously be performed through non-tech means, much of the spread of digital technology - especially those indicated here - are limited to urban areas. For example: Airlift Express, one of Pakistan’s online delivery startups, delivers its services in Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. This certainly reflects the demand patterns across the country, but is also reflective of already present geographical cleavages in digitising basic services.


The options for the above two questions were:
Purchase groceries
Pay utility bills
Do banking transactions
Read books
Connect with family and friends
Work
Attend classes

The variance between the increasing usage of online services compared to the disparity in the provision of these services is reflected tremendously in the increasing demand for quality internet in all areas that were essentially not urbanised cities. Particularly, earlier in the year, students, activists and residents demanded better internet connectivity for Gilgit Baltistan, especially with an influx of students looking to attend online classes after returning due to the pandemic. In an article published in The Diplomat, student activists demanded better internet services in the Balochistan province too, a demand that was met with repression and arrests on the part of the authorities.

Privacy

With the advent of the pandemic, governments globally introduced a range of new policies to control and inhibit the spread of the virus within local populations. Among these were various surveillance methodologies employed to trace contacts of infected individuals as well as control compliance with other policies. Various organisations and human rights monitors have protested against the unregulated use of these extraordinary measures and strategies under the banner of public health measures, arguing that these infringe upon civil rights, especially the right to privacy, and by extension democracy itself. For example, Privacy International argued: “Unprecedented levels of surveillance, data exploitation, and misinformation are being tested across the world.”

In particular, a report dated June 2020 highlights the vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s tracking system executed through a COVID app, it was noted that “the app uses hard-coded credentials, which it sends insecurely, to communicate with the government server, and it downloads the exact coordinates of infected people in order to provide a map of their locations. A second independent test found that the app uses an unencrypted database that can be accessed by either an attacker with physical access to the device or a malicious app with root access.”

The response to these mechanisms was varied in the survey results. 43% of the respondents expressed similar concerns over the government’s increased use of tracking and data collection mechanisms to record patients' health, travel and contact histories, with around 35% arguing that they wanted to see more transparency with the data collection processes. 23.4% of the respondents were comfortable with their data being collected but with the condition of some safeguards being present. Lastly, 31.3% agreed that this data collection was essential and were comfortable with it in its current form.

However, a large majority of respondents (nearly 55%) were not comfortable downloading a contact-tracing application on their phone, compared to the 34% who were. The rest were indifferent. This ratio increased when we asked if they would be comfortable if they government mandated said applications - 64% responded that they wouldn’t, while only 27% responded affirmatively.

All that said, our respondents did report having access to and knowledge of digital safety and security - for example, as shown in the graph below, a significant majority reported using two factor authentication. Similarly, upto 93% reported that some or all of their devices were password protected.

Lack of information, Misinformation and Fake News

According to a report published by the Digital Rights Monitor, “even as the internet use soared across the country during the pandemic, people in the newly merged districts continued to rely on printed brochures and radio to get information about the virus. The delayed information about COVID-19 could have been fatal for those who would have contracted it, and lack of information about it would have promoted its spread as well. Not only were people barred from accessing crucial life-saving information, now their routine access to healthcare was also restricted.”

Furthermore, the ‘Manual on Fake News during COVID-19’ written by Digital Rights Foundation argued that fake news, especially on Whatsapp, was at an all time high since March 2020. The kinds of misinformation included: fake cures to mitigate the spread of the virus and manage illness, misinformation about the vaccine and it’s efficiency and so on.

In a study published in 2020 about Covid-19 related Whatsapp messages, Javed et al. used the following illustration to categorize misinformation about the pandemic. Fake news formed the largest of these, including wrongly identifying people diagnosed positive, the amount of deaths globally, hysteria-inducing news about surveillance systems and data collection.

Fig 1.1: Graph from Javed et al.: %age of WhatsApp texts about Covid-19 related misinformation

 

As the graph below shows, a large majority of respondents to DRF’s survey felt that fake news has increased during the pandemic.

Furthermore, a large number of respondents felt that Whatsapp contained the most misinformation amongst major social media platforms. 95% of respondents reported that they verify information before sharing it further on social media, especially Whatsapp.

According to these initial survey results, Covid-19 related digital transformations, privacy and state facilitated data collection and the effects of varied access to digital technologies is differently perceived across respondents. While they provide baseline data for further study and research, some important caveats to digital research remain, especially driven by huge disparities in access to the internet and other related devices. Further research may relate to studying disparities relating to gender, income level and so on.

Bibliography:

 

 

December 1, 2020 - Comments Off on Combatting the COVID19 Disinfodemic: A situation analysis for Pakistan

Combatting the COVID19 Disinfodemic: A situation analysis for Pakistan

Author: Mehwish Batool 

Mehwish Batool is an academician and researcher currently working at Forman Christian College - A Chartered University

She tweets @Mehwish_Bat00l

Supported by:

Introduction

Starting December 2019, humankind has witnessed the spread of two deadly viruses. The first one being Covid-19 – a pandemic that has claimed over 1.25 million deaths till now. The second one was a disinfodemic. The damage that the disinfodemic has done is yet to be determined in terms of its scale (many researches are underway), but it has proved no less dangerous than the novel coronavirus.

In this report, we are analyzing Pakistan’s response to Covid-19 related fake news and what can be done to contain the spread of this era of disinfodemic in the wake of the second wave.

What is Disinfodemic?

The term “Disinfodemic” is a combination of two words “disinformation” and “pandemic.” UNESCO coined this term to refer to the wide spread of false information related to the coronavirus. This is a global issue and there is hardly any region of the world that has not been hit by a misinformation or disinformation campaigns around Covid-19. 

Source: https://en.unesco.org/covid19/disinfodemic

The Outbreak of Disinfodemic

The first case of coronavirus in Pakistan was reported on February 26, 2020. But fake news about the virus was spreading way before that. In January 2020, forwarded messages started circulating on WhatsApp about people dying in China due to a “mysterious disease.” Soon after that, a few Facebook pages and Twitter profiles started posting video clips taken from a Hollywood movie and equated them with the situation in Wuhan. Pakistan’s mainstream media was rather careful in its reporting of coronavirus, but that had more to do with its hesitation to comment on anything controversial related to China than the fact that it was exercising any social responsibility.

https://twitter.com/WaqasLalwani/status/1222145983867498496

While most of the initial WhatsApp posts had the usual "قدرتی آفت" (natural calamity) and "خدا کا عذاب "  (divine affliction) narrative, there was a particular forwarded message that advised people not to order anything from AliExpress as the virus can stay on the delivery package for days. The Current ( a Pakistani digital only news outlet)  tried to debunk this myth and advised their readers to not opt for faster delivery in order to reduce their chances of getting infected by the virus:

https://thecurrent.pk/can-you-get-coronavirus-through-your-aliexpress-order/

As it turned out, AliExpress packages did not become the gateway to Pakistan for coronavirus but the virus did reach us eventually. What followed next was a flood of false information related to COVID-19 origin, remedies and how it spreads.

Misinformation and Government’s Response

Social media became the breeding ground of misinformation on coronavirus; with WhatsApp leading the way as the super spreader of this disinfodemic. Controversy theories were on the rise and many social media users were calling this virus a "یہودی سازش" (A Jewish conspiracy) or an aftermath of a 5G experiment. However, there was no sustained disinformation campaign in Pakistan as far as the origin of the virus is concerned. Zarrar Khurro (Twitter : @ZarrarKhuhro), a senior journalist at Dawn, is of the view that in Pakistan, Covid-19 related misinformation was rather harmless than many other countries. “Of course, the typical WhatsApp forwarded messages were there, but we did not see any sustained disinformation campaign here driven out of political agenda like the one we saw in the US.”

Zarrar Khurro is partially right! Most of the fake news around Covid-19 in Pakistan was not politically motivated. It was harmful nonetheless as the majority of social media users believed in such messages without verifying them. WhatsApp chats and Facebook groups were flooded with posts and videos advising people not to visit hospitals as doctors might inject them with poison and sell their dead bodies to Bill Gates/USA/WHO. In an interview for this piece, Dr. Arslan Khalid (@arslankhalid_m), who is Prime Minister’s focal person on digital media, said that this would have become a dangerous pattern if left unaddressed.

In order to prevent this kind of misinformation, the government took two major steps. In March, the government  took all the major digital media portals and influencers on board for an awareness campaign around Covid-19. Digital content from the likes of Nashpati Prime and Bekaar Films gathered good views and sensitized the public about the pandemic:

Apart from this, a committee was formed by the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC) in July to prepare a legal framework to counter the spread of false information about the pandemic. This committee worked under the Chairmanship of the Interior Minister retired Brig. Ijaz Shah, while representatives of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MOIB), Health department, the Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan (ISPR), and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) were part of the committee too. Dr. Khalid, who is also one of the members of the committee, said that they identified and removed many fake posts that termed Coronavirus as a hoax. He also pointed out that social media companies such as Facebook did not promptly respond to fake news complaints raised by the government and it was difficult for them to identify fake content that was shared in local languages.

The curious case of Corona remedies:

Perhaps the largest number of fake news in Pakistan was related to the cure of the virus. Ranging from immunity boosting drinks that can prevent the infection to home-made remedies that can cure corona positive patients; social media was filled with unverified and false information. According to Ramsha Jahangir (@ramshajahangir) - a journalist and researcher with a focus on technology and human rights - the key factor that led to the rapid spread of misinformation was the novel nature of the virus itself. “The corona crisis was unprecedented; it was new and unknown. There were no hard facts about Covid-19 and the situation was constantly changing. Even WHO had to change its policies a couple of times. Now, it has been eleven months and we still don’t have a definite cure to Covid-19, which is why everybody is coming up with different theories.”

As the number of Corona cases increased in Pakistan; desi remedies recommending the use of garlic, saltwater, onions, lemon juice, senna leaves (sana makki) and ginger have all featured in viral posts on social media. In a matter of a few days, several whatsapp forwards started making rounds suggesting remedies for the cure of coronavirus. Most of these remedies were falsely credited to WHO, UNESCO, US and UK based doctors.

A post went viral in which UK based Dr. Nazir Ahmed, a non MBBS doctor dealing in herbal medicine, claimed that he had cured over 150 Covid-19 patients with tea made out of sana makki. This misinformation was soon debunked but not before the demand of sanna makki reached an all-time high in the country. Some of the government officials also shared such posts on their social media accounts and gave way to corona related rumors.

Source: https://twitter.com/fasi_zaka/status/1240619748079153152

https://tribune.com.pk/story/2234073/1-tribune-fact-check-sana-makki-cure-covid-19

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/669097-growing-demand-drives-herb-prices-up

If we put aside the misinformation that was spread via social media, the government’s core messaging around corona was also problematic to some extent.  We can see that eleven months into the pandemic and we as a nation have not been able to adopt mask-wearing and social distancing practices at a mass level. Dr. Arslan Khalid defends the government “I believe that everybody became a medical expert during the corona crisis. This trend was not limited to social media only; mainstream media also added to the misinformation. The way Plasma therapy was hyped by our media, even though its effectiveness is still unproven, that could have been avoided. It’s not just the government, media and civil society should also sensitize the public.”

Fact-checking efforts around Covid-19:

The cure for Covid-19 pandemic is yet to be found but effective and timely fact-checking can surely cure the disinfodemic. In the wake of the corona crisis, many international organizations have launched fact-checking initiatives that aim to debunk the myths and provide sound scientific guidance. In Pakistan, we can identify  few such initiatives, but their reach and effectiveness is still to be determined. The government of Pakistan, for example, has added a section on its Corona portal  titled Myths about Covid-19. It has also introduced Chatbots on Messenger and WhatsApp and a Fake News counter on the Press Information Department (PID) website. Around 200 influencers have been taken on board by the Prime Minister Office to keep the public well-informed (#ehtiyatcorona Urdu for ‘be careful about corona’).

https://covid.gov.pk/

http://coronacounter.pid.gov.pk/fake-news.html

Apart from this, we have a few independent fact-checking organizations such as Soch Fact-Check, Sachee Khabar, and Surkhi who are working to debunk myths around coronavirus. According to Ramsha Jahangir, there are no dedicated fact-checkers in the mainstream media, but a few organizations such as Dawn and Express Tribune have some fact-checking mechanisms in place.

Fact-checking is being done in Pakistan at some level, but these initiatives have limitations in terms of reach and effectiveness. Misinformation spreads at a rapid speed; and these portals don’t have the capacity to counter false news with the same strength and magnitude. Much more needs to be done now to enhance Pakistan’s response to this disinfodemic.

 

Using Digital Literacy to fight Fake News:

Now that the country is going through the second wave of Covid-19, there is a dire need to launch Digital Literacy programs and equip the citizens to identify and counter fake news. Zarrar Khurro argues that “Fact-checking has now become a life skill. Everyone should learn to do a basic Google search and reverse image search before forwarding any Covid-related remedy.” It might be easier said than done but there cannot be a better weapon to fight disinformation than to equip the public with fact-checking skills. The consumers of fake news need to be apprised of this disinfodemic and how to counter it. To achieve this goal, a collaboration is required between all the key stakeholders; the government, media, and civil society. Media and Information Literacy (MIL) programs should be designed to address Covid-19 disinformation. Educational institutes could step up to impart fact-checking skills among students. Local body officials can also play an important role by engaging people in their constituencies.

The existing fact-checking infrastructure also needs an overhaul. There must be dedicated fact-checkers in the newsrooms across the country. At the same time, the capacity of independent fact-checking organizations should be increased. Government should actively work with social media companies to identify and debunk any false information related to coronavirus. While doing so, it must keep its personal vendetta aside and should not target the voices through dissent. Our experts have a few more suggestions to curb the disinfodemic:

Zarrar Khurro (Senior journalist – Dawn)

Journalists should exercise caution while reporting corona related information. Always attribute the information to credible sources only.

Government should facilitate independent fact-checkers to debunk Covid related misinformation. Information shared in local languages must be closely monitored for fact-checking. 

Education and Health ministries should collaborate with educational institutions to create Media and Information Literacy (MIL) programs focused on Covid-19. Training programs for teachers, students and parents should be organized.
Ramsha Jahangir (Journalists and Researcher)


Mainstream media has a wider reach than that of independent fact-checkers. The media must step up now and hire fact-checkers in their newsrooms. 

Debunked and fact-checked content must be translated in Urdu and local languages.


We need to create digital literacy programs that do away with the jargons and go down to basics. A common person doesn’t understand the difference between misinformation and disinformation. S/he doesn’t know how to report Fake News on Facebook, Twitter and other social media platforms. These skills should be taught to people in the language that they understand.

Zainab Husain (Managing Editor at Soch Fact-Check) (@ZainabHusainn)

Journalism degree programs throughout the country should introduce mandatory courses on fact-checking and source verification. 

Local media organizations should take advantage of the resources offered by International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and First Draft. Links: https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/ & https://firstdraftnews.org/

Digital media portals that have a good number of followers should exercise some responsibility before publishing viral stories. They should publish only verified information and should regularly debunk myths around coronavirus.

Dr. Arslan Khalid (Prime Minister's Focal Person on Digital Media)


Media should regularly debunk the myths around coronavirus. It seems we have to live with this crisis for more time now, so awareness campaigns on the mainstream media should not be stopped.

We need to tweak the communication strategy in the wake of the second wave. Core messaging can remain the same but we need to expand our delivery channels and address misinformation proactively.

Our health communication strategy needs to be revised in order to prepare a ground for Covid-19 vaccination, if and when it becomes available.

 

November 11, 2020 - Comments Off on Punjab Police Women Safety App: Old Approach, New Interface

Punjab Police Women Safety App: Old Approach, New Interface

November 11, 2020

This week the Punjab police launched it’s ‘women safety’ android phone application in an effort to leverage technology to enhance policing for women’s safety. After immense and justified backlash in the aftermath of the horrific motorway gang-rape incident in Septemeber, it is not surprising that the Punjab police is attempting to implement women-centric reform. However, as an organisation working on tech and gender for a number of years, the Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) sees the approach and the application both as wholly inadequate for tackling the issue of gender-based violence in the country.

The application can be downloaded from Google Play Store here.

What does it do?

The main feature of the application is its ‘panic button’ which can alert the law enforcement authorities regarding an incident of gender-based violence at a particular location. Apart from that, the application provides access to numbers of the following agencies: Punjab Police Emergency Helpline 15, Rescue 1122, Punjab Highway Patrol and Motorway Police.

         

Furthermore, the application has an ‘emergency live chat’ feature, though it is unclear whether the feature is a chatbot or run by the Punjab Police personnel. There is also a section on laws relating to violence and harassment; however, our team felt that the section needed to be translated into Urdu as well and could do with more visual/video-based content to make the laws more accessible. Lastly, the app crowd-sources safety reviews of different locations across the province, allowing users to pin rate locations as “secure”, “partially secure” and “not secure” according to their experience.

   

The Location Review feature is a good idea as it allows policymakers to track which locations are marked and unsafe and design policy interventions to rectify the problem. This, however, comes with a caveat as the data will only be meaningful if a large number and diverse set of users contribute to it. Additionally, data collected from these reviews should not be used to justify surveillance and over-policing measures in certain locations, which create additional human rights concerns and issues of discrimination rather than solve the problem of women’s safety.

Limitations

Currently, the application is only available on Playstore and compatible with Android phones, which excludes those with iOS-based phones. Furthermore, given that Pakistan has one of the highest gender digital divides in the world, the application essentially only caters to women with smartphones and access to mobile internet. According to the GSMA “Mobile Gender Gap Report 2020”, Pakistan has the widest mobile ownership gender gap as women were 38%  less likely than men to own a mobile phone and 49% less likely to use mobile internet. As per a study by LirneAsia, a think-tank based in Sri Lanka, Pakistani women are 43% less likely to use the internet than men.

The digital safety team at DRF reviewed the application to find a number of issues in terms of privacy. Given that the app collects highly personal information including phone number, location access and NIC number, robust data security and protection policies must be in place to ensure that the women using the application can trust the technology. Furthermore, the permissions of the app include GPS and network-based location, phone number, access to phone contacts, media files and storage.

The digital safety team at DRF reviewed the application to find a number of issues in terms of privacy. Given that the app collects highly personal information including phone number, location access and NIC number, robust data security and protection policies must be in place to ensure that the women using the application can trust the technology. Furthermore, the permissions of the app include GPS and network-based location, phone number, access to phone contacts, media files and storage.

       

Unfortunately, when the team tried to review the privacy policies in place, the link redirected to the ‘Career page’ on the PSCA website, https://psca.gop.pk/PSCA/privacy-policy/:

For anyone using the app, it is apparent that women’s privacy and safety of their personal information was not a priority for the Punjab Police or the developers of this app. For many women reporting a crime of gender-based violence is accompanied by immense anxiety about privacy in terms of their identity and information--without these assurances, women are unlikely to place their trust in the app. In the absence of personal data protection legislation in the country, lack of privacy policies and protocols is a huge concern. Any intervention for women’s safety that neglects to keep their private data safe is counterproductive and wholly incomplete.

Technology as a Silver Bullet for Women’s Safety?

This is not the first time that authorities and tech developers across the world have sought to introduce applications that can address the issue of gender and sexual violence. In fact, this is not even the first time the Punjab government has attempted this, as the current application seems to be a relaunch of an old application developed by the Punjab Safe Cities Authority (PSCA) introduced in 2017. Nevertheless, there is increasing consensus within researchers and experts that women’s safety applications are unsuited to adequately addressing the question of violence against women.

Firstly, these applications treat women’s safety as an issue that only occurs in public places and crimes perpetrated by strangers. This approach fundamentally misunderstands issues of violence, which are perpetrated inside the home (domestic violence, marital rape and sexual violence at the hands of family members and ‘trusted’ individuals). This means that applications such as these are only scratching the surface of the violence and harassment that women face in society at large.

Secondly, no amount of technology and applications can solve the systemic problems of misogyny and patriarchal mindsets within the police and public institutions. Often women do not report cases of violence because of societal perceptions around victims and victim-blaming by law enforcement bodies. Technology will not change these attitudes. Applications such as these just provide a new interface for an old institution. Until and unless law enforcement bodies and the legal system, in general, engage in systemic reform at every level, any technological interventions will be rendered superfluous.

Thirdly, surveillance cannot and should not be posited as a solution to women’s safety. DRF has pointed out several times that technological interventions that seek to increase surveillance of women’s movement and bodies in order to ‘protect’ them are simply benevolent and paternalistic patriarchal control in another name. Technology often ends up replicating familial and societal surveillance of women’s bodies which does not truly emancipate or change the root causes of the violence against them.

Fourthly, if the app seeks to serve all women it should take into account issues of accessibility for women and persons with disabilities. Currently, for instance, the app lacks features to make the text and graphics readable for visually impaired persons. The app does come with a video explaining how to use it, however more visual and video content regarding the laws and other features will make it more accessible to women who are not literate.

This application comes less than two months after the motorway incident which shook the mainstream national consciousness on the issue of gender-based violence, particularly rape. It is no secret that the Punjab Police received immense criticism because of the victim-blaming remarks of the CCPO Lahore, Umar Sheikh. As per data collected by the DRF team, through monitoring of English-language newspapers, 123 cases of gender-based violence have been reported in just two months after the incident. Incidents such as these often compel law enforcement to engage in interventions and reform that creates the public perception that steps are being taken to address the problem--however cosmetic changes such as new apps do little to actually change things. ‘Internet Democracy,’ an organisation based in India, has noted that after the 2012 Delhi rape case several ‘women’s safety’ applications emerged. Similar to Pakistan, these technological interventions did little to change the ground realities that women face on a daily basis.

Conclusion

It seems that the Punjab Police has taken a top-down approach to women’s safety by developing (or rather rebranding) technology to ‘protect’ women without taking into account the actual lived experience of women and gender minorities in Pakistan. No effort seems to have been made to consult women’s rights and digital rights organisations when making the technology. Technology cannot be expected to enact social change or facilitate marginalised communities if its design does not incorporate the very communities that it seeks to serve. Additionally, technology cannot be used as a smokescreen to dent criticism of policing and the barriers women face at the hands of law enforcement if it is not accompanied by structural and meaningful reform.

 

November 2, 2020 - Comments Off on Pakistani students in Wuhan: the other side of the story

Pakistani students in Wuhan: the other side of the story

Autor: Tehreem Azeem

Tehreem Azeem is a digital media journalist and a Ph.D. scholar at the Communication University of China.

She tweets @tehreemazeem

Supported by 


“Can you connect me with any Pakistani student in Wuhan?”

This was the common request I was getting from my friends and colleagues working in media houses of Pakistan. I came to Beijing in September of last year to do a PhD in Communication Studies. Four months later, I saw China battling a novel coronavirus which we all today know as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

Some of my friends in the media took my comments too for their stories on the situation of Pakistani students in China but I was living in Beijing, 1,115 km away from the virus-hit Wuhan. They were more interested in connecting with someone from Wuhan. Soon, we realized the media was interested in the ‘we are dying here’ statements only. Many of the students stopped talking to the media as it was not helping them; instead, it was making their families in Pakistan more worried.

Hira* completed her PhD in December from a university in Wuhan. She had booked a flight of late January which got cancelled after the city was put into lockdown. The university had stopped her stipend as she had graduated. Her university allowed her to stay on campus for free the whole period.

‘It was tough. The university was helping us at every level. They gave us masks, sanitizers, and anything we wanted to get from outside. My problem was a bit different. My stipend had stopped. I did not know how long the quarantine would go. I requested the embassy to at least send us (those who had graduated) to Pakistan. We had nothing to do here,’ she said.

She finally left Wuhan on the first flight of Pakistan International Airlines on 19 May 2020. She spent her quarantine talking with Pakistani girls in a WeChat group. That was the time when some students from Wuhan University of Science and Technology released a video on social media in which they said they had limited food supplies and the government must evacuate them. I asked Hira if she was getting the groceries easily in Wuhan.

Screenshot from the video message of Pakistani students of Wuhan University of Science and Technology

‘Yes, that was not the problem. I had rice, pulses, and spices. I could also order groceries online. Prices of few commodities did go high but I would not say that I was not getting anything.’

Hira said the students were scared of the uncertainty of the whole situation. They just wanted to leave China.

Pakistan decided not to evacuate its citizens from Wuhan. The news was immediately picked up by international media. Deutsche Welle news published a video on their YouTube channel with the title ‘Is Pakistan abandoning its citizens in China?’. The anchor talked to a student from the Xianning city of Hubei province to know the living conditions in lockdown. He told him that he could not even go out of the campus and the city was in complete lockdown.

‘There is no transportation. Our city is totally locked down - no trains, no airports. We are just trapped in our rooms and no one is here to help us.’

Later, a TV anchor took senior journalist Shahzeb Jillani on the video link to get his comment on this issue. Jillani clearly said the real reason behind Pakistan’s decision to not evacuate its citizens from Wuhan was Pak-China friendship.

‘The official stance is that Pakistan does not want the disease to spread. It is acting under WHO guidelines and the Chinese have assured them that we will take care of the situation but the real reason we all know is the special relationship between China and Pakistan.’

No doubt, that was the main reason Pakistan refused to airlift its people from Wuhan. The government first announced to provide financial aid to students in Wuhan and later said it will also send food. The students did receive money but that was not equivalent to USD 840 which was promised. Each student in Wuhan received 3500 yuan which makes USD 496. However, eight students of the University of Chinese academy of sciences and twelve students of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural sciences did not receive this money till the end of March. They received the money after the issue was highlighted in a report of Independent Urdu.

The Pakistani media should have investigated these stories but it preferred to disturb our families in China. Social media influencers or bloggers were no different. Comedian Junaid Akram in a podcast while criticizing the government on its stance about students in Wuhan said that he received calls and messages from relatives of people living in China. He said that students in China had not much food to eat and that they were surviving on whatever rations they had.

Junaid Akram released this podcast on 2 February 2020

TV channels in Pakistan showed visuals from the video message of students from Wuhan University of Science and Technology in their news bulletins. Jamal Ahmed was a student of The Communication University of China in Beijing. His family told him to take the first available flight to Pakistan after they watched these reports on TV channels. Ahmed had to buy an expensive ticket and return to Pakistan; otherwise, he had planned to go after his graduation in July. He talked to a couple of journalists before his departure.

‘I told a journalist that China has even closed mosques so people could not gather at any place. The reporter wrote in their report that Muslim students are even not allowed to go to mosques in China. I contacted the person and asked them to correct it. They changed it after half an hour.’

Ahmed stopped watching TV after he returned home. He said watching TV during the outbreak was creating more panic than the virus itself.

Nazish Zafar of BBC Urdu says the media was taking information from the videos students were posting on social media. She says those videos had different messages – some students wanted to come back, and some did not. The media preferred to stay with the videos, which showed panic, helplessness, and fear.

‘Also, there was no official statement to verify and crosscheck their claims of food shortage. President Alvi and the Foreign minister after their visit to China told the media that the students had asked for Pakistani food. This statement somehow confirmed that the students had food-related issues.’

Sisters Sehar Iqbal and Mehar Iqbal are studying Chinese literature at Wuhan University.  They started vlogging in January. They released a video on 26 January 2020 in which first, they showed the masks their university had given them. Later, they went out of the campus to buy groceries for lockdown. They say we don’t know how long we will have to live like this. In their next video, they talked about the situation of foreigners in Wuhan. They said the situation was not as bad as it was being shown.

‘Our teachers are taking care of us. The whole Pakistani community of our university is in a WeChat group. Our representative took details of each student and forwarded it to the embassy. It’s not like we are alone here.’

Both sisters, Sehar Iqbal and Mehar Iqbal share screen in one of their video on YouTube: Screengrab

They also told that the university had opened its cafeterias and supermarkets which normally are kept closed during summer and winter vacations. Dawn news shared their video in a news story. Aljazeera also published their video on its website and social media platforms on 3 February. This video became the most-watched video on its Facebook and Twitter accounts that week. Both sisters talked to many media houses after that giving the same stance that the situation was not as bad in Wuhan as the media was showing.

When I approached them to have their comments for this piece, they told me that the Pakistani students of their university were threatening them for their comments on media. They said to me that the Pakistani community of their university had decided to give a single narrative in media to push the government to send a plane for their evacuation.

They shared screenshots of a few messages they had received on the Chinese messaging app WeChat with me. In one message, a student told them to take permission from him before giving any comment in the media. The student has written in his message that even male students take his permission before talking to the media. He also wrote that the girls were disrespecting him for not doing so.

Iqbal sisters told me that that particular student is still in China. He did not go back to Pakistan when the plane finally arrived in Wuhan.

A friend of them sent them a message to tell that many members of the Pakistani community had asked him for their fathers’ mobile number. Apparently, they wanted to call him to stop their daughters.

They also received a message from a Chinese number on their WhatsApp in which the sender said that they were not supporting their brothers and sisters. In a friend request on WeChat, a person not only abused them but also threatened to leak their biodata.

The girls said that their WeChat id and WhatsApp number was already shared in the Pakistani community. Some students even called their house and talked to their parents.

The girls were in touch with an official in the embassy of Pakistan in Beijing. They shared these screenshots with the officer. The official did not do much except calling the dean of their department who called them and assured of his full support. Iqbal sisters did not file any complaint to the International Students Office of their university. They said they were so afraid and they did not want any of those threats to come true.

Both sisters appeared in Zara Hat Kay of Dawn News on 9th April 2020. In this show, they mentioned that they were receiving threats for their comments. They also told the hosts how their university was taking care of them during the peak of the outbreak.

While talking to me, they said that their university was providing three-time meals, masks, sanitizers, fruits, sanitary napkins for female students, and diapers for the families with children.

A PhD student of their university who wishes to remain anonymous and who had sent them a threatening message said that the community had decided to put pressure on the government through the media for their evacuation.

‘The whole situation was uncertain here. Everything was closed at that time, and we had no idea when things will come to normal at that time. No student from Wuhan University said that they were not getting food supplies. Some of us had medical issues; three women were pregnant. The outbreak was putting them into depression. Some people were above 40 years of age. That is why the community here was pressurising the government for evacuation.’

I also asked him about the threats Iqbal sisters were receiving for not following what the community was directing and sticking with their comments. He said it might have happened and no one should be blamed for it. It was the uncertainty and the fear of getting an infection that made them harsh.

 This single event tells us how user-generated content can affect media reports if not verified or cross-checked. The Iqbal girls went through a lot, more than any of us whose families would call them hysterically after watching TV reports about our situation in China. That was a tough time. It has passed, but we have lost our faith in the media of our country.  

*Names were changed to protect the privacy of the individual(s)

September 2, 2020 - Comments Off on Cyber Bullying And Its Effects On Teenagers/Adolescents

Cyber Bullying And Its Effects On Teenagers/Adolescents

By Sara Israa 

Cyberbullying or cyber harassment are no new terms. They are now commonly experienced by people who are active on social media and who use online spaces. Cyberbullying could be defined in many ways but basically it is when someone intentionally sends hurtful messages and pictures, spreads false information, threatens or blackmails you, hacks your social media, or impersonates you. It is something which is persistent, which is probably meant to intimidate the victim. The perpetrator might be known or unknown.

With the influx of technology, social media, and unlimited access to internet services, cyber bullying is on the rise. It won’t be wrong to say that online spaces are now becoming unsafe day by day, since we are not aware of the predators behind the screens. The peak of cyber bullying is now actually taking a toll on mental health. Teenagers are the most common victim of this since they belong to a vulnerable part of society and they also excessively use online spaces. It is disturbing because of its public and uncontrollable nature.

The teenagers who are cyber bullied experience a range of emotions such as increased anxiety, low and sad mood, school absenteeism, decreased self-esteem, difficulty focusing, and in extreme situations even suicide. Cyber bullying and adolescent mental health hold a strong relation together. There has been vast research that validates that harassment on the internet introduces feelings of guilt, worry, and depression. This at times aggravated since many teenagers have a hard time communicating. This results in self-blame which might be a reason for them choosing suicide. 

Cyber victimization at times also leads to teenagers isolating themselves and spending their time worrying over the consequences of being shamed online. Similarly, children who experience cyber harassment may experience anger outbursts and may have relationship problems later in life. Cyber victims are more likely to experience somatic problems, including difficulty sleeping, headaches, and stomachaches, as compared to their unaffected peers. Many children in order to overcome or get away with post shame of cyber harassment may also indulge in substance abuse. 

 Unfortunately, most teenagers are unaware of digital safety hence they fall prey to cyber bullies. Also, a vast majority of research shows that in the past decade cyber harassment has become so prevalent that it is not considered a public health concern. 

With cyber harassment showing a strong correlation with adverse effects of mental health it is high time now that we make the youth more aware of cyber safety. We at the individual and collective levels should try to make online safety more accessible. There is a dire need for mental health counselors to address the concerns of cyber victims and provide them with platforms where they can vent out and word out their perspectives and thoughts without being judged. 

There are some ways which adults or parents can use to save their children from being cyber bullied. Firstly, be empathetic and listen to your child so that he/she can confide in you without fear. As a parent or adult, you can make sure that your child’s profile is private and not public, limit the number of friends your child adds on social media and allow only those to be added which he/she knows in real life, ensure about passwords safekeeping and ensure that your child knows how to report, block or delete someone who is harassing them. Get them engaged in offline activities. Remember, the less time they spend on their devices, the less likely it is that they will be cyberbullied.

References

Nixon, C. L. (2014). Current perspectives: the impact of cyberbullying on adolescent  health. Adolescent health, medicine and therapeutics5, 143.

Vaillancourt, T., Faris, R., & Mishna, F. (2017). Cyberbullying in children and  youth: Implications for health and clinical practice. The Canadian journal of  psychiatry62(6), 368-373.

https://parents.au.reachout.com/common-concerns/everyday-issues/cyberbullying- and-teenagers

Munawar, R., Inam-Ul-Haq, M. A., Ali, S., & Maqsood, H. (2014). Incidence, nature  and impacts of cyber bullying on the social life of university students. World  Applied Sciences Journal30(7), 827-830.

June 19, 2020 - Comments Off on Virtual ‘Private’ Networks no Longer Private as PTA Requires Registration

Virtual ‘Private’ Networks no Longer Private as PTA Requires Registration

Areeba Jibril is a DRF intern focusing on issues related to privacy, free speech, and elections. She tweets at @AreebaJibril

Finding a Virtual Private Network (VPN) provider in Pakistan is easy. A quick google search will pull up multiple free services. Casual internet users may register for these services to circumvent paywalls and access online content that has been blocked in Pakistan. They can do this without even really knowing what they’re signing up for. More sophisticated users may use VPNs to ensure that their IP addresses, and therefore their geographical location and identity, remain hidden from the websites they visit.

What casual users likely don’t know is that the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has announced a registration requirement for all Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) by 30th June 2020. This is twenty-two days after they first posted a public service announcement on their website. The PTA regulations do not ban the use of VPNs entirely, but they do require users to register their VPN use with their Internet Service Providers (ISPs). To do this they must share their CNIC number, the purpose for which they would like to use a VPN, and which IP address they will be using their VPN with. The privacy intrusion is not limited to this information. –The notification is vague, therefore it is difficult to say with authority the extent of the privacy intrusions that may come about. There is online speculation about the extent of information that the government can feely request from non-VPN users and whether the same practices will apply to VPN-users as well.

The Pakistani government claims they’ve added this requirement to support the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry and promote the “safety of telecom users.” But requiring registration of VPNs defeats the purpose for which VPNs were created. VPNs cannot be private if they must be registered with ISPs, who are then required to share the information with the government. The information flow doesn’t stop there – the government has contracted with Sandvine Corporation, a US-based company, to monitor ‘grey’ internet traffic.

The 10th June announcement isn’t forthcoming regarding the significance of this announcement, by claiming that this is “not new”. It’s true that users have been reporting that their VPNs had suddenly stopped working since 2011. However, this new announcement includes the threat of legal consequences, without much clarity on what these consequences will be. The drastic consequences to privacy do not need to be new to be concerning. The PTA claims to be using its authority under clause 4(6) of Monitoring and Reconciliation of Telephony Traffic Regulations (MRITT), 2010. 

VPNs can be helpful for the average internet user when they want to access content such as television shows that aren’t otherwise available in Pakistan. But they serve a much more important purpose in promoting freedoms of opinion and expression by protecting the privacy of users. By using a VPN, users can ensure that the websites they visit and the content they post cannot be traced back to them. For many, anonymity is an important part of what makes the internet a safe place.

David Kaye, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, noted, “Encryption and anonymity provide individuals and groups with a zone of privacy online to hold opinions and exercise freedom of expression without arbitrary and unlawful interference or attacks… A VPN connection, or use of Tor or a proxy server, combined with encryption, may be the only way in which an individual is able to access or share information in [environments with prevalent censorship].”

As the list of registered VPN users will be shared with ISPs, the risk of private information being accessed by those with malicious intent will increase dramatically. Without the ability to hide their physical location, users will be in greater danger if they use the internet to communicate discontent with the government and seek help anonymously. 

Some users may decide they cannot risk this intrusion to their privacy and refuse to register their VPNs. It is unclear how these users will be treated. The government can request that non-registered users have their VPNs blocked. However, they have also said that users who fail to register their VPNs can face legal consequences if they cause “loss to the national exchequer.” They maintain that they are adding this requirement to terminate “illegal traffic.” These vague terms should be a great cause of concern. What is illegal traffic? What will be considered a “loss to the national exchequer”? When will users be held legally accountable for failing to register their VPNs? The lack of guidance increases the risk that these laws will be used to target political dissidents and unpopular speech.

The notification concerning VPNs, coupled with the news from a few months back regarding ‘Deep Packet Inspection’ (DPI) poses a serious threat to online privacy and security for the common Pakistani citizens. DPI allows unprecedented access to a private individual’s activity online. The added issue with the DPI technology is the fact that the government has been incredibly silent on how they plan on using the technology and what the purpose of it is. This silence and general vagueness is somewhat similar to what we’re witnessing nowadays when it comes to this notification regarding VPNs in the country.   

Pakistan is not alone in regulating the use of VPNs. Belarus, China, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Oman, Russia, Uganda, the UAE, and Venezuela have either introduced some measures to restrict the use of VPNs or banned the use outright. Iran allows the use of VPNs, but only if providers are Iranian while Russia bans VPN usage for sites that have previously been blocked by Russia’s governing body for telecommunications and mass media communications. Consequences for using VPNs are also wide-ranging. In China, the government has gone so far as to arrest a VPN provider. In Oman, private users face a 500 rial fine ($1300USD). 

Given the human and digital rights track record of these countries, this is not a list of countries that Pakistan should want to be on.  

Sources:
https://www.pta.gov.pk/en/media-center/single-media/public-notice---get-your-vpn-registered-080620

http://tickets.nexlinx.net.pk/index.php?/News/NewsItem/View/45

https://www.dawn.com/news/1512784

https://www.pta.gov.pk/en/media-center/single-media/public-notice---get-your-vpn-registered-080620

The coming Pakistan VPN ban: PTA sets deadline for VPN users to register by June 30th
https://www.pta.gov.pk/media/monitoring_telephony_traffic_reg_070510.pdf. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/08/vpns-are-a-vital-defence-against-censorship-but-theyre-under-attack/
Where are VPNs legal and where are they banned?
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41160383

May 30, 2020 - Comments Off on COVID-19 GOV PK: The Tech to Battle Coronavirus

COVID-19 GOV PK: The Tech to Battle Coronavirus

As COVID-19 has spread across Pakistan, questions have been raised about how the Government will tackle the spread of the virus. Across the globe we have seen different approaches to this, varying from comparatively relaxed to extremely stringent.

A popular global approach to health surveillance has been contact tracing[1], followed by surveillance and testing. Contact tracing is an old public health technique which tracks an infected person by tracing the places they visited and the people they met. In order to stem the spread of the virus, all those who came into contact with the infected person are then tracked down, informed of their contact and told to self isolate, or are immediately tested for the virus. This process goes on with each new case and is supposed to help ‘map’ the virus as it spreads. In some countries, mobile applications have been launched to track the virus and help people see ‘where’ the virus is.

These apps act as a way for governments to warn the public about cases nearby, and also allow people to report themselves as patients, so as to keep the cycle of contact tracing going. While such extensive mapping may be helpful for tracking the disease on the macro level, these apps present on the flip-side, major privacy concerns.

Take for example this detailed account of South Korea’s Patient #10422:

Before being diagnosed, patient #10422 visited the Hanaro supermarket in Yangjae township on March 23 from 11:32 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. The patient was accompanied by their spouse, both wearing masks and using their own car for transportation. On March 27, the pair visited the Yangjae flower market from 4:52 p.m. to 5:18 p.m., again wearing masks. They then had dinner at the Brooklyn The Burger Joint at Shinsegae Centum Mall from 6:42 p.m. to 7:10 p.m. This detailed record can be found, publicly available, on many government websites, and is a testament to the extensive contact tracing carried out by Korean authorities.[2]

The minutiae of this account goes to show the extent to which data is being collected and observed.

In many instances, the state response has been immediate and comprehensive which hints at the presence of such tech and mechanisms being in place before the pandemic swept the globe, as is apparent from Pakistani PM Imran Khan’s statement: "It (system for tracking and tracing) was originally used against terrorism, but now it is has come in useful against

[1]https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-surveillance-technology-powered-south-koreas-covid-19-response/

[2]https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-surveillance-technology-powered-south-koreas-covid-19-response/

coronavirus."[1]  This necessitates the inclusion of a detailed data protection and destruction policy to accompany the launch of such apps which mandate the destruction of the data once the health-related utility is over.

At home, our concerns begin from the knowledge that the government of Pakistan is implementing a policy of mapping that involves tracking citizens and their movements. Internationally, there has been debate about the efficacy of contact tracing, however, at the same time, some countries have seen success with this policy. In the context of Pakistan, unfortunately, these measures are accompanied by a lack of trust between the State and citizens. Multiple instances[2] of citizens' data being leaked from one of the biggest national biometric databases in the world, i.e. the Nadra database, has created a faith deficit. Instances of CNIC and family registration certificates (FRC) information being sold online for as low as $1-2 a piece due to a data leak at a provincial level and possibly national level cement this belief.

The “COVID-19 Gov PK” app, released by the National Information Technology Board (NITB) and the Ministry of National Health Services, has been available for use since early April and has been downloaded with an unsurprising frequency given the alarm among the masses, with a rough estimate of more than 500,000 installations at the time of writing.

The very limited privacy policy (found below) states that it is ‘adhering to social, moral, ethical values, and privacy’ while providing no details of the same and referring to no framework under whose jurisdiction these values are defined and the same goes for the element of privacy.

Given that the app seeks permission for geolocation data of the device it is being used on, and personal medical and geographical data of the user, the policy included within the app is not sufficient or clear on exactly how this data is being processed and who has access to it.

[1]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/pakistan-intelligence-services-track-coronavirus-cases-200424073528205.html

[2]https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/drf-condemns-yet-another-breach-of-nadra-database-and-demands-strong-data-protection-legislation/

A rapid evidence review published by the Ada Lovelace Institute in the UK sets out, amongst other measures, the proposal for the formation ‘of a new Group of Advisors on Technology in Emergencies (GATE) to oversee the development and testing of any proposed digital tracing application.[1]

We at DRF submit the same and ask that a GATE advisory be created to oversee the development, rollout and implementation of fair and citizen rights-protective technologies to combat the pandemic in Pakistan and that a proviso be extended from the outset as to the limitations, especially in terms of time-frame, be allotted and notified with every new tech measure the governments, both Federal and provincial, take to combat the pandemic.

As more and more of offline life has moved online, the increased activity has subsequently led to more complaints of online harassment and crimes. In light of this, there is no reference to heightened concerns regarding the ‘security’ of the app and the personal data being saved. In a White Paper, titled ‘Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracking’ (D3PT), experts in the field highlighted that centralised databases made about patients are at a higher risk of being attacked and leaked than decentralised ones. The white paper makes the case for a decentralized database since it offers a more stringent security policy and quicker response to any attempted data breaches. A centralized system requires a phone to upload all its contact information onto a central database, similar to what the UK is doing currently. In contrast, decentralized systems cross reference a device’s contact information without uploading it to a central database. This is similar to how the European Union has implemented contact tracing. If intelligent decisions are not made about how this data is saved, attackers can access personal information, malicious actors can target patients and in some cases lead to discriminatory practices being adopted. Already we have seen this happening in Balochistan where COVID-19 positive patients’ medical data was leaked[2] to reveal their identities which is not only a massive privacy breach on its own but is only made more complicated by the social stigma attached to corona patients.

The White Paper talks about how the transmission of data works in such apps. Most COVID 19 tracking apps have a feature called the ‘Radius Map’ that tells the user if their immediate surroundings have had a reported case of the novel coronavirus. It does this by using bluetooth signals that bounce off of other users of similar apps. Because of this, specific locations of patients can be pinpointed to the average user. The White Paper highlights this as a privacy concern. Additionally, they also highlight the fact that these signals can be manipulated by hackers to create false alerts of nearby COVID 19 patients, spreading panic in an already volatile situation.

More worryingly, the government app does not rely solely on Bluetooth technology but also makes use of location data which makes it more invasive by a significant degree. These concerns are not helped by the fact that the app does not even meet the standards set by tech giants like Apple and Google, who have collaborated together to develop the APIs for coronavirus app development and have released a detailed set of documentation on exposure notification, its framework and cryptography to promote ‘privacy-promoting contact tracing’.

We submit that the Government of Pakistan share detailed SOPs regarding the COVID 19 app launched by them. These should detail their privacy policy in full, addressing data retention and destruction through a clear and unambiguous sunset clause. Also, we maintain that the Government should share with the public as to who exactly has access to this database and strict guidelines regarding data sharing. While we appreciate that this is an unprecedented situation, the Government still must act in a manner that best protects its citizens' data and their right to privacy, a right enshrined in the country’s Constitution of Pakistan. This, to us, includes the maintenance of the right to opt-in in terms of app usage for everyone, even government employees or essential and frontline workers.

The requirement of immunity certificates must also not be made a condition on which citizens’ mobility and access to benefits rests. These immunity certificates are a focus of debate at the moment with several European nations considering issuing ‘passports’ which allow the holder (a recovered COVID-19 patient) access to a social life but also to civil liberties like the freedom of association and movement. These measures have the potential for unprecedented surveillance and control over public life and cannot be made a prerequisite for exercising fundamental and inalienable constitutional rights.

While we understand the imperatives of the public health emergency, it is important that the State establish some boundaries and limitations to their policy, to ensure their citizens have tangible reasons to place their trust and data with them. The current privacy policy contained within the app itself is inadequate to address these queries and cannot be supplemented given the absence of any data protection legislation in Pakistan. We demand also that the apps that are developed to aid the healthcare emergency be open source[3]. This would not only promote transparency but give a tangible boost to the faith placed in the government’s initiatives for its citizens.

The principle of proportionality is required here, in terms of the strength and effect of the measures being employed. Technology is an asset in these times, however we demand that the increasing centrality of technology be done in a safe, transparent and just manner.

[1]https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/exit-through-the-app-store-how-the-uk-government-should-use-technology-to-transition-from-the-covid-19-global-public-health-crisis/

[2]https://balochistanvoices.com/2020/03/private-data-of-coronavirus-patients-leaked-in-balochistan/

[3] Open Source refers to software whose source code is readily available online can also be audited by digital security experts for security standards etc.

May 20, 2020 - Comments Off on Evidence of Twitter, Periscope and Zoom restrictions in Pakistan

Evidence of Twitter, Periscope and Zoom restrictions in Pakistan

Network data from the NetBlocks internet observatory confirm that Twitter, Periscope and Zoom were restricted on multiple internet providers in Pakistan on the evening of Sunday 17 May 2020, commencing approximately 18:30 UTC and lasting over an hour. This report produced in partnership with the Digital Rights Foundation presents findings on the schedule events.

It is shown that the Zoom restrictions appear technically unrelated to international issues that affected call quality earlier in the day. Further, it is shown that Twitter, Twitter’s image and video servers, Twitter’s streaming platform Periscope and the Zoom videoconferencing website share the same timeline of disruption, consistent with previous documented social media platform disruptions in Pakistan.

Sunday’s incident matches the characteristics of previous documented restrictions applied on grounds of national security or to prevent unrest such as the Pakistan’s November 2017 social media blackout.

What happened on Sunday?

Late on Sunday 17 May 2020, users across Pakistan started reporting inability accessing the Twitter social media platform and Zoom videoconferencing service.

Users were able to regain access using VPN tools which circumvent national censorship or filtering mechanisms. During this period the #TwitterDown hashtag trended in Pakistan.

A real-time incident alert was issued by NetBlocks presenting initial findings which are developed and examined further in the present report:

The bulk of reports from Pakistan describe a loss of access to affected services. Other reports from Pakistan describe the “throttling” or slowing of Twitter. NetBlocks data indicate that backend image and video servers were specifically unavailable during the disruption period, corroborating these reports.

How does this relate to international outages?

Zoom experienced technical issues earlier on Sunday affecting certain types of meetings on the service for a limited subset of users. The company issued an update at 15:43 UTC confirming that the problem was resolved, hours prior to the onset of social media disruptions in Pakistan.

No widespread user reports of outages are evident in other countries at the time of Pakistan’s social media blackout. NetBlocks performance metrics from around the world show that Sunday’s disruption was localized to Pakistan:

International reachability metrics show impact by country over two days, with nation-scale disruption evident solely in Pakistan during the reported period

A closer examination of the specific time interval for Sunday’s disruption in Pakistan also shows no restrictions or disruptions in effect outside of Pakistan:


Additionally, timings show that the services were disrupted in the same time window in Pakistan, and restored at the same moment:

Findings are drawn from a core sample of 300 network performance measurements observed from 30 network/location pairings across Pakistan supplemented by a wider dataset of international metrics for comparative use.

Why were Twitter, Periscope and Zoom disrupted in Pakistan?

No explanation or legal order has been presented by authorities or network operators at the time of writing.

Pakistan has previously implemented similar restrictions during mass-protests and limits internet access each year during Ashura. However, no protests were held on Sunday and public manifestations are unlikely as Pakistan remains under partial lockdown in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Researchers note that the timing of restrictions as well as the set of platforms affected coincide with a “virtual conference” critical of Pakistani policy held via Zoom, shared on Twitter and reportedly streamed via Periscope on Sunday evening.

News report suggest the virtual event generated controversy in Pakistan, stoking tensions between Indian and Pakistani political activists. Nevertheless, a nation-scale social media blackout in response to a virtual event would be a notable development for Pakistan.

NetBlocks encourages network operators and governments to report disruptions and their legal basis, where available, in a transparent manner in keeping with international standards.

This investigation is conducted by NetBlocks and the Digital Rights Foundation.

Methodology

Internet performance and service reachability are determined via NetBlocks web probe privacy-preserving analytics. Each measurement consists of latency round trip time, outage type and autonomous system number aggregated in real-time to assess service availability and latency in a given country. Network providers and locations enumerated as vantage point pairs. The root cause of a service outage may be additionally corroborated by means of traffic analysis and manual testing as detailed in the report.

originally published on @NETBLOCKS

May 5, 2020 - Comments Off on Digital Rights Foundation’s Legal Analysis of the 2020 Personal Data Protection Bill

Digital Rights Foundation’s Legal Analysis of the 2020 Personal Data Protection Bill

History of Data Protection Legislation in Pakistan

According to the UN, 107 countries across the world have enacted data protection and privacy legislation. In order to ensure the fundamental rights of its citizens and compliance with international human rights standards, Pakistan has also taken steps to enact a personal data protection law in Pakistan. Article 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees the Right to Privacy, however serious efforts to introduce a law were first taken in 2018 (though a draft Bill was put forward in 2005 but was deemed too weak) when the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication (MOITT) introduced a draft Personal Data Protection Bill in July 2018 and invited comments from the public. The Bill was lauded as a good first step, however suffered from serious issues in terms of scope as it restricted the definition of personal data to “commercial transactions”, limiting its applicability to government-held data, and the proposed Data Protection Commission was not sufficiently independent in its functions and composition. 

A second iteration of the Bill was shared by the Ministry in October 2018, with slight improvements in terms of definitions but many of the same concerns remained especially when compared to international best practices such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). There was little headway by the MOIT since despite appeals from civil society and being taken up by bodies such as the Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights. The third draft of the Personal Data Protection Bill (referred henceforth as the “Bill”), was put forward by Ministry in April 2020.

Executive Summary

We appreciate the efforts by the MOITT in making data protection and privacy of citizens a priority. Furthermore, we welcome the consultative process adopted by the Ministry. However we hope that during a time when the entire world, including Pakistan, is under lockdown and reeling from the economic, social and public health implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, that such important legislation will not be passed hastily and without the opportunity for an inclusive and open consultative process.

The new 2020 Personal Data Protection Bill, while a better version in comparison to the drafts issued in 2018, still does not fully capture the data protection needs of people in Pakistan. The most prominent issue we see with the draft is the exemption-making and wide-ranging powers given to the Federal Government, in particular under Sections 31 and 38 which risk undermining the protections afforded under the Act. Government bodies collect and process vast amounts of personal data and the obligations in the Act must extend to them and the Government should not be able to introduce further exemptions without proper scrutiny and safeguards. Additionally, the independence of the Personal Data Protection Authority of Pakistan needs to be ensured, by limiting the powers of the Federal Government to appoint members and approve rules made by the Authority (Section 48).

The need for and reliance on technology has and will drastically increase during the COVID-19 pandemic and in a post-Coronavirus world where we will see a predominantly offline world transform into an online world. Access to online platforms of communication, healthcare, education and business is no longer a luxury. In the midst of all this, the need for protection of our personal data is essential more than ever.

Our primary recommendations to the Ministry are:
  1. Definitions of terms such as “Public Interest” and “Critical Personal Data” should be explicitly defined under the Act;
  2. The definition of “Sensitive Personal Data” should be expanded to include categories such as “membership of a trade union” and “philosophical and/or religion beliefs”;
  3. Implementation of the Act should be on a progressive basis to ensure a balance between rights protection and a grace period for data controllers to ensure compliance;
  4. Clearer language regarding scope and jurisdiction of the Act;
  5. Mandatory requirements for obtaining consent should be expanded to include information on intention to transfer of personal data to a third country and the level of protection provided, the existence profiling for targeted purpose, and the existence of automated decision-making;
  6. The Act should develop a higher consent standard for personal data of children and young adults below the age of majority;
  7. Clearer and minimum requirements for security measures for data controllers should be laid down in the Act;
  8. Data localisation measures introduced for cross-border personal data flows should be seriously revised in light of international best practices;
  9. Procedure for withdrawal of consent should be simplified to ensure that it is as easy for the data subject to withdraw consent as it is to give it;
  10. Rights of data subjects such as the right to data portability, right to information related to profiling and automated decision-making, and right to compensation should be explicitly included in the Act;
  11. Powers of the Federal Government to make exemptions under Section 31 be removed;
  12. Safeguards should be included to ensure independence of the Data Protection Authority;
  13. Powers of the Federal Government to issue policy directives under Section 38 should be removed.Find DRF’s detailed, section-by-section analysis of the Personal Data Protection Bill 2020 here.

 

February 20, 2020 - Comments Off on Citizens Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules, 2020: Legal Analysis

Citizens Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules, 2020: Legal Analysis

The ‘Citizens Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules, 2020’ have been notified under sections of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act, 1996 and the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Parent Acts’). Under these Rules, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority is the designated Authority. This legal analysis will highlight the jurisdictional and substantive issues with the Regulations in light of constitutional principles and precedent as well as larger policy questions.

Summary of the Legal Analysis

Given that the Rules exceed the scope of the Parent Acts and substantively violate the fundamental/Constitutional rights, particularly Article 14 and 19, they are inconsistent and in derogation with the Constitution as well as the Parent Acts and should be immediately denotified.