All Posts in Publications

September 25, 2025 - Comments Off on Probing Attacks on Journalists: Investigative Analysis of PECA’s Post-Amendment 2025 Cases 

Probing Attacks on Journalists: Investigative Analysis of PECA’s Post-Amendment 2025 Cases 

Over the past decade, Pakistan has experienced a rapid increase in digital connectivity and technological advancement. The internet has become a central platform for citizen engagement, political participation, journalistic expression, and public debate. However, this digital shift has also introduced pressing challenges, including the spread of misinformation, cyber harassment, privacy breaches, and other forms of cybercrime. These concerns have prompted the government to intervene and enact robust legal mechanisms to regulate digital spaces. 

The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), was introduced as a primary law in Pakistan to govern online spaces and to provide safeguards against cybercrimes. Its provisions addressing offenses such as unauthorized access, identity theft, cyber harassment, child pornography, cyberbullying, and defamation provided a legal framework to enhance cybersecurity and protect individuals from the emerging threats of the digital age. However, over time, the implementation of PECA has evolved in a way that extends beyond this protective scope, shifting its focus away from the original purpose of safeguarding against online crimes for which it was enacted. 

In practice, rather than focusing on combating online crimes, the state's implementation of PECA appears directed at harassing, intimidating, and silencing the voices of critics. PECA now stands as a tool to restrict the right to free expression in online spaces, particularly for journalists, and has given rise to distressing attacks. 

Journalists and media practitioners have been the primary targets of PECA and have been subjected to attacks for their reporting, critique of state institutions, or exposing corruption. Attacks on them are becoming increasingly common, ranging from targeted disinformation campaigns to legal intimidation. The Clooney Foundation for Justice, an international organization dedicated to various causes for human rights protection, including monitoring trials targeting journalists to advocate against unfair convictions, published a comprehensive report in 2023 entitled "Section 20 of Pakistan’s Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act: Urgent Reforms Needed." This report documented cases of unfair prosecution of journalists in Pakistan and provides evidence regarding the prevailing pattern of using PECA by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) as a tool to suppress press freedom and target journalists.

These practices to harass journalists stand in direct conflict with Pakistan's constitutional guarantees and international obligations. The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 lays out clear guarantees for freedom of speech and expression. Article 19 states that “Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or incitement to an offence.” This constitutional safeguard provides the journalists and press with a strong legal foothold, even while permitting limitations. In Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1998 SC 823), the Supreme Court recognized freedom of the press as one of the pillars of individual liberty that cannot be curtailed beyond what the Constitution expressly permits. The 18th Amendment further strengthened this provision through  Article 19A, which states, “Every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law.” Together, these provisions were designed to ensure that journalists can not only publish freely but also gather the information needed to do so.

Beyond constitutional guarantees, statutory protections also exist. The Press Council of Pakistan Ordinance, 2002, established a body to safeguard press freedom, uphold ethical standards, and provide a forum for complaints of interference, although its powers remain limited. More significantly, the Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act, 2021, passed by the National Assembly on November 8 and signed into law on December 2, 2021, is regarded as the most comprehensive piece of legislation on media safety in Pakistan. Its provisions affirm journalists’ right to life, privacy, and non-disclosure of sources; ensure independence in the performance of journalistic duty; and provide safeguards from harassment or violence. In Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No.2939/2020 IHC), the Islamabad High Court (IHC) reinforced these protections by quashing a cybercrime notice issued to a journalist, holding that the notice violated his constitutional rights to free speech and access to information and that the state bears a duty to protect the independence of journalists.

Along with the domestic legal obligation to safeguard the rights of journalists, Pakistan also has an international obligation under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Pakistani legal system contains wider restrictions than ICCPR standards, as officials use national security and religious reasons to limit press freedom. The media faces censorship, while websites and YouTube channels get blocked, and reporters experience intimidation and oppression despite existing international obligations and constitutional protections. The 2025 global press freedom rankings place Pakistan at 158th of 180 countries, making it one of the most dangerous states for journalists. The UN Human Rights Committee, together with advocacy groups, has expressed worry that Pakistan violates ICCPR commitments through its extensive application of laws such as sedition, defamation, and blasphemy laws.

Despite the existence of such extensive national safeguards and international commitments that uphold press freedom, Pakistan has consistently disregarded these guarantees. Instead of protecting rights through legal frameworks, PECA has been used to curtail them. This trajectory reached a critical turning point with the introduction of the PECA Amendment Act 2025 (PECA Amendment), which further contributed to the restrictions on free expression rather than addressing the law’s earlier flaws.

With the passage of this amendment, Pakistan has further redrawn the parameters of online free speech, and once again, journalists are bearing the brunt. As noted by several critics and journalists, and highlighted in the Digital Rights Foundation’s analysis of the PECA Amendment, the legislation marks a negative turning point for Pakistan’s digital landscape by creating vague criminal offences which are potentially weaponized to suppress accountability and discourage individuals from speaking out or sharing information due to the threat of legal repercussions. This PECA Amendment transforms the already problematic online spaces into heavily monitored, state-regulated platforms, where free expression is further suppressed by criminalizing undefined "fake news" under section 26-A. 

As per the newly added Section 26-A through the 2025 Amendment, “Whoever intentionally disseminates, publicly exhibits, or transmits any information through any information system, that he knows or has reason to believe to be false or fake and likely to cause or create a sense of fear, panic or disorder or unrest in general public or society...” The newly introduced 26-A introduces severe penalties for violations, including imprisonment for up to three years, a fine ranging from one to two million rupees, or both. It is interesting to note how the PECA Amendment, or the original PECA Act itself, does not define the terms ‘fake’ and ‘likely to cause unrest’, leaving broad discretion in the hands of authorities. The legal ambiguity of Section 26-A has turned this provision into a powerful tool to curb free speech, rather than serving its original intent. As a result, journalists face FIRs, notices, summons, arrests, and prolonged investigations and trials. Such cases are now widespread in the country, occurring in both major cities and smaller districts. 

The examples below, especially those registered after the recent PECA Amendment 2025, highlight the growing trend of using amended PECA provisions not for accountability and online safety, but to deter investigative reporting and control over the press freedoms. 

Cases related to Propaganda and Fake News

  1. In March, Journalist Farhan Mallick, founder of the media agency Raftar, was also arrested in Karachi by the FIA on allegations of running “anti-state” content on his YouTube channel. He was booked under Sections 16, 20, and 26A of PECA, along with Sections 500 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and was remanded into FIA custody for four days. As per the FIR, Farhan Mallic, by using the alleged YouTube Channel, namely “Raftar TV”, is involved in generating and continuously disseminating and uploading posts and videos related to anti-state with fake news and public incitement agenda. 
  2. In March, Journalist Waheed Murad was also taken from his residence in Islamabad, after which the FIA Islamabad registered a case against Journalist Waheed Murad under Sections 9, 10, 20, and 26A of PECA over allegations of posting intimidating and misleading content online. It is also stated in the FIR that Mr Murad shared highly intimidating content on social media platforms, at Facebook and X, leading to the dissemination of false, misleading, and misinterpreted information, which leads to hatred against government functionaries.
  3. In April, a case was registered against journalist Muneeb Indhar at Dadlo Police Station in Pano Aqil, Sukkur, under section 20 of PECA along with sections 500, 504, and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code, for allegedly using derogatory language against President Asif Ali Zardari on his Facebook account.
  4. In July, a Judicial Magistrate in Islamabad, on the request of the National Cyber Crimes Investigation Agency (NCCIA), ordered the blocking of 27 YouTube channels under Section 37 of the PECA for allegedly spreading fake, misleading, and defamatory content against government institutions and the armed forces. The blocked channels included those run by journalists as well. Subsequently, a revision petition has been filed against the order. On September 9, 2025, Additional District and Sessions Judge Mohammad set aside the order, declaring the Magistrate lacks the jurisdiction, while deciding that the PTA is still competent to take action as per law.
  5. In August, an FIR was registered by NCCIA Islamabad against journalist Khalid Jamil under sections 20 and 26-A of PECA on accusations of “deliberate pattern of conduct involving mocking, ridiculing, and maligning state institutions with the clear intent to instigate public discontent”. As per the FIR, Mr Jamil was found sharing highly intimidating content on X, and his profile has knowingly disseminated fake and false information  leading to hatred against the government functionaries. 

Cases related to Local Accountability Reporting

  1. On 29 July 2025, journalist Iftikhar Ul Hassan (Director News, Samaa/PTV, based in Multan) posted on social media about actions taken by the deputy commissioner and chief officer of the Municipal Committee against the Grand City Housing Scheme in Vehari district, Punjab. Following this, the Vehari administration, through Chief Officer Naeem Khalid, filed an FIR against him under Section 20 of the PECA . 
  2. In July, an FIR was registered at Daniwal Police Station on the complaint of Municipal Officer Majeed Pathan against journalist Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry. The FIR alleged that Aslam uploaded a video on social media accusing the Municipal Committee Vehari of using substandard materials in a World Bank–funded road construction project under the Punjab Cities Program, claiming the video was intended to blackmail and damage the administration’s reputation and noting that Aslam lacked the technical expertise to make such claims. The case was lodged under Sections 20, 24, and 27 of PECA. 
  3. In August, journalist Irfan Khan posted on X (formerly Twitter) that deputy commissioner posts in Lakki Marwat, Malakand, and Karak districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were being sold for up to Rs 25 million. After the post, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Secretary Establishment filed a complaint with the NCCIA, accusing him of spreading false and defamatory content against the provincial government.

The above cases show how online spaces in Pakistan, once celebrated as platforms for free expression and accountability, have become increasingly vulnerable for journalists. The rise of vague and sweeping laws against so-called “fake news” has blurred the boundaries between free expression and criminal conduct. Critical reporting that highlights major issues is now treated as a potential offense under the guise of 'fake news'. From national headlines to local stories, no piece of journalism remains safe from legal repercussions, leaving journalists exposed to harassment, censorship, and even legal action.  Each new FIR under the banner of “fake news” gives a louder message that speaking facts in today’s digital spaces comes at the cost of freedom, safety, and sometimes one’s career. In the longer run, the law will not only impact journalists but also ordinary citizens, content creators, activists, and even businesses that rely on open digital discourse.

To reclaim the promise of a free digital landscape, Pakistan must urgently reform PECA, and entirely eliminate PECA Amendment to eliminate ambiguous provisions and adopt global best practices by other countries, where various states have shown changes in law, institutions, and safety systems to help weak media environments grow into stronger democratic ones. In 2013, Jamaica abolished criminal defamation laws, removing the risk of imprisonment for journalists and helping to curb self-censorship. Ghana undertook a similar step in 2001 by repealing criminal libel, a reform that contributed to one of the freest press systems in Africa. Sweden also illustrates the importance of institutional safeguards, with strong protections for sources and independent press councils that preserve editorial independence while ensuring ethical accountability. On the safety front, the Netherlands’ PersVeilig initiative demonstrates how collaboration between law enforcement, prosecutors, and media organisations can provide rapid responses to threats. Colombia offers another model through its National Protection Unit, which supplies at-risk journalists with relocation support, bodyguards, and other protective measures in high-risk environments. To protect journalists in practice, Pakistan could draw on these precedents to introduce legal reforms, independent regulation, and strong safety mechanisms in order to reduce punitive prosecutions against journalists.

In short, this investigative piece, with the aid of case studies, exposes the systemic attacks on journalists, revealing a stark reality of censorship and curtailment of basic freedoms. Laws intended to protect vulnerable groups, including journalists, are now being misused against them. This probe highlights the ills of politically motivated amendments and demands that legal instruments and their enforcement agencies deliver justice instead of serving those in authority. 

May 2, 2025 - Comments Off on Rampant misinformation and hate speech surrounding Pahalgam attack on Indian and Pakistani media

Rampant misinformation and hate speech surrounding Pahalgam attack on Indian and Pakistani media

By Sara Imran and Maria Nazar, Research Associates, Digital Rights Foundation

Note: This is a developing story; updates will be provided as the situation develops.

In the deadliest attack in Kashmir since 2000, suspected rebels killed 26 tourists in Pahalgam, a tourist resort in Indian-administered Kashmir, on 22 April 2025. Chaos erupted on social media since the attack, with Indian media outlets and users pointing fingers at Pakistan as the instigator, whereas the Pakistani government denied its involvement and blamed “home-grown” forces within the Indian-administered territory, additionally terming it a “false flag operation”. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to punish "terrorists and their backers" and pursue them to “the ends of the earth”.

A statement issued in the name of The Resistance Front (TRF), an armed group that emerged in Kashmir in 2019, allegedly claimed responsibility for the attack. On 25 April, they then allegedly denied any involvement in the attack, citing in their statement a “brief and unauthorized message” posted on one of their digital platforms, which after an internal audit they have “reason to believe…was the result of a coordinated cyber intrusion – a familiar tactic in the Indian state’s digital warfare arsenal.” The TRF statement further read: “This is not the first time India has manufactured chaos for political gain.”

In the chain reaction of escalations triggered by the Pahalgam attack, India closed its main border with Pakistan, expelled diplomats, cancelled SAARC visas, and suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan, reading the suspension of the IWT as an “act of war”, reacted with a series of countermeasures, including the closure of its airspace and the Wagah border, and the possible suspension of the Simla Agreement.

In tandem with the breakdown in diplomatic ties between the two countries, rampant misinformation was observed across social media platforms and news outlets in India and Pakistan. At a recent briefing with diplomats, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch rejected what she termed the “Indian misinformation campaign against Pakistan”.

In this tense atmosphere, aiming to timely capture and report on the dangerous misinformation surrounding the Pahalgam attack, DRF analysed 72 unique posts by 52 unique users and media outlets across 6 social media platforms–X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, and YouTube–and discovered instances of not only mass misinformation, but also hate speech, threats, and even genocidal intent, by a mix of Indian, Pakistani, and other users and media outlets.

The data on misinformation and hate speech respectively has been categorised by DRF into five major misinformation claims, i.e. the claims that went most viral or were most under discussion, and three major hate speech-laden threats.

Major misinformation claims

1. The attack was a Pakistan military operation

In the finger-pointing that directly followed the attack, a major point of content online was the alleged involvement of the Pakistani military.

The allegation of Pakistani military involvement was propagated by Indian news channel Times Now, which has been spreading much misinformation and fake news around the Pahalgam attack, including the viral couple video, which will be discussed further on.

Indian news channels like Republic TV continue to run headlines with inflammatory hashtags like #WeWantRevenge flashing across their tickers, with an on-site reporter claiming “Terrorists from Pakistan have attacked here" on a YouTube live broadcast.

Interestingly, the claim of Pakistani military involvement in the attack was not leveled solely by Indian media, but also by at least one Pakistani, Adil Raja, a war veteran and investigative journalist with a large Pakistani following.

However, these claims entirely lack evidence to support them. The Pakistani government has outright denied any involvement in the attack, with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar rejecting Indian allegations of cross-border terrorism as “baseless blame games”.

2. ‘Final video’ of couple allegedly killed

As the identities of the tourists came to light, one of the victims was identified as Indian Navy officer Lieutenant Vinay Narwal. A video of Lt. Narwal and his wife dancing in Kashmir on their honeymoon began to go viral, with captions such as “The last video shared by Lt. Vinay Narwal before the #PahalgamTerrorAttack”. These were shared by major Indian news outlets, such as Times Now.

These videos were widely posted and reshared, stirring up a great deal of public sentiment around the tragic death of these individuals. In one Reddit post, the video was shared with the caption “...Pak will pay for this..”.

 

However, in a surprising turn of events, the next day, the couple from the dancing videos posted a video on their Instagram account clarifying that they were, indeed, not a victim of the Pahalgam attack, and were alive and well. The video was being shared as fake news by falsely linking it to the attack.

The couple expressed distress at their video being shared by all major Indian outlets without being fact checked for veracity, and urged their audience to report all such videos which, in their view, had been posted only for views, “making it challenging to trust news sources”.

It was noted that the majority of news outlets who posted the viral video, took them down after the couple debunked it. Meta has also added fact-check disclaimers to the posts still up on Facebook. However, the misinformation had already spread widely before these measures.

3. Kashmiri locals sheltering terrorists

Another major misinformation claim that gained immense popularity among Indian social media users and news outlets and led to a considerable volume of hate speech being perpetuated against Kashmiri locals–the majority of whom are Muslim–was that these locals had been giving ‘shelter to terrorists’ and were involved in the attack.

These claims, in addition to being baseless, also seemed particularly unbelievable and contradictory once reports started emerging of a local Kashmiri pony handler, Adil Hussain Shah, who heroically lost his life trying to protect the tourists from the attackers. The residents of Srinagar, Kashmir, also held a candlelight vigil protesting against the killings, further casting a shadow on the veracity of these claims.

4. Pakistan Army resignations

On 27 April, a new wave of misinformation spread across social media. An Indian X user posted a letter with the Pakistan Army emblem, alleging that Pakistani military officers and soldiers had resigned en masse “amid rising tensions”.

The post was viewed 1M+ times, and reposted widely.

Following this, on 28 April, another post was shared by the Executive Editor for the Indian -Telugu channel TV9 Network, with another letter alleging mass resignations being reported in the Pakistan Army.

This post has over 1.3M views, 10K likes, and 3.1K reposts, and is still up at the time of writing. 

An independent Pakistani fact-checker, Pak Observer, has debunked the viral letters, claiming that they are rife with errors such as a misspelling of “Pakistan Zindabad”, and naming the wrong person as the current DG Inter-Services Public Relations.

5. Removal of Indian Northern Commander from his post

This piece of misinformation originated and spread in Pakistan between 29 and 30 April. Several Pakistani accounts on X, including Khara Sach anchorperson Mubasher Lucman’s, spread misinformation regarding the detainment and/or removal of the Indian Northern Commander Lt Gen Suchindra Kumar from his post following the Pahalgam attack.

India’s Press Information Bureau categorically fact-checked and debunked these claims on Wednesday 30 April, in a post on X, stating that “Lt. Gen MV Suchindra Kumar is attaining superannuation on April 30.”

AI-generated misinformation

Besides the major misinformation claims surrounding the Pahalgam attack, DRF also observed instances of AI-generated images and videos which helped to spread misinformation and fake news.

These included an image generated with the help of the Meta AI tool, as checked by an independent Indian fact-checker. This image was often used to accompany posts about the attack.

The video is now accompanied by the Meta third-party fact-check label; however, it is still up on Facebook.

An AI altered video of Zakir Naik went viral, which depicted the Islamic scholar claiming that the Quran instructs Muslims to kill Hindus.

An interesting point to note is how, conversely, there were also instances of AI being used by social media users to fact-check dubious claims. For instance, there were several instances of users replying to X posts, tagging the xAI assistant Grok to help them fact-check claims.

Hate speech and threats

Our findings revealed that misinformation was not the only form of dangerous content circulating online. Hate speech was rampant, with Indian accounts and media outlets targeting Pakistanis and Kashmiris, and vice versa. In many cases, the misinformation gave way to the hate speech, as in the case of the false claim that Kashmiri locals were aiding and abetting the terrorists, which allowed Indian users to justify their death threats targeting Kashmiri Muslims.

Three major hate speech categories were observed: Indian calls to invade/bomb Pakistani cities, calls to starve Pakistanis using (an uninformed understanding of) the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, and genocidal rhetoric targeting Muslims in Indian-administered Kashmir.

1. Threats to invade Pakistani cities

2. Threats to starve Pakistanis

These threats referenced the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, despite the severity of the short-term consequences being debunked by environmental experts.

3. Genocidal rhetoric targeting Kashmiris

Arnab Goswami, Editor-in-Chief of Indian news channel Republic TV, which has 6.73M YouTube subscribers, appeared on air to call for an “Israel-like” “final solution” in Kashmir.

On the other hand, Pakistani X accounts made misogynistic comments sexualising Indian celebrities, referring to them as “maal-e-ghaneemat”, or “spoils of war”.

Pahalgam: a complete failure of platform accountability

While DRF aims to provide timely analyses on dangerous online trends and the spread of misinformation and fake news, it has time and again come to light that during volatile events like the Pahalgam attack, there is a total and utter lack of platform accountability and governance across platforms.

With massively inflammatory content leading to communal incitement, and even outright genocidal posts gaining views and reshares in the millions and thousands, it is clear that platforms have not only failed to take down these posts, but their algorithms are actively amplifying them. Designed to prioritise engagement, these algorithms often push the most provocative and emotionally charged content to the forefront, regardless of its accuracy or potential harm. The more outrage a post generates, then, the more likely it is to be promoted on user feeds, creating a feedback loop that rewards violence, hate, and sensationalism with visibility. This is no accident. It is a direct result of a business model built on attention and sensationalism. Tech oligarchies, emboldened by profit and shielded by vague notions of free speech, continue to dodge real accountability. Many of these platforms have grown increasingly hesitant to moderate hate, and chosen to monetise it instead.

In a region on the brink of war, such unchecked misinformation is not merely irresponsible; it is incendiary.The cost of this negligence at best, and complicity at worst, is sky high. When narratives are left to fester unchallenged by facts, they don't just distort reality; they can help shape deadly outcomes.

The gap between platform policies and their implementation

Except for the few examples cited above, for most of the data analysed, these platforms failed even to accompany harmful content with community notes, fact-check disclaimers, content warnings, and other moderation tools. This is despite each of these platforms having community guidelines regarding misinformation.

Since Musk’s X takeover, the platform removed its policy on Crisis Misinformation, and as such no longer has a dedicated corporate policy that addresses “false or misleading information that could bring harm to crisis-affected populations (…) such as in situations of armed conflict, public health emergencies, and large-scale natural disasters”, which the Pahalgam attack and subsequent tensions comes under. However, in a blog post titled “Maintaining the safety of X in times of conflict”, X claims to have a comprehensive set of policies that “promote and protect the public conversation”, citing posts violating their Terms of Service made during the “Israel-Hamas conflict” as an example of implementation. The enforcement of these policies include:

  • Restricting the reach of a post
  • Removing the post
  • Account suspension
  • Ineligibility of such posts for monetisation
  • Community notes

However, out of all the posts that were analysed by DRF in this particular instance, not a single one faced even one of the above mentioned repercussions.

Meta’s Misinformation Policy seeks to “remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm.” In its Transparency Center, it also addresses third-party fact-checking:

Once a fact-checker rates a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it may receive reduced distribution on Facebook, Instagram and Threads. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent. For Missing context, we focus on surfacing more information from fact-checkers. Meta does not suggest content to people once it has been rated by a fact-checker, which significantly reduces the number of people who see it.

While to Meta’s credit, many of the most viral misinformative videos about the dancing couple were either removed or taken down by the media outlets who published them, and there was at least one case of a label being added to an AI-generated post, as mentioned above, these posts had already gone viral before such measures were employed, and several popular posts reposting the same misinformation are still up on Facebook and Instagram.

According to YouTube’s misinformation policies, it does not allow “certain types of misinformation that can cause real-world harm”. The enforcement of these policies include:

  • Removal. Content is taken down if it violates policy
  • Warning. Issued for first-time violations, usually without penalty
  • Training. Option to complete policy training for warning expiry
  • Strike. Given if the same policy is violated within 90 days
  • Termination. Triggered by 3 strikes or severe/recurring violations

Once again, in YouTube’s case, it was noticed that channels with subscribers in the millions posted misinformation and incendiary content with viewership in the thousands, as documented above. There was no implementation seen of the strike system, and the harmful content remains on the platform till date.

Conclusion

After the chaos that has been observed in online spaces in the fallout of the Pahalgam attack, it is clear that digital spaces can be just as volatile and dangerous as physical ones. If misinformation and hate speech continue to surge unchecked, inflammatory and potentially genocidal rhetoric will cost lives. There is an urgent need for ethical responsibility and accountability from platforms, policymakers, and users alike.

January 23, 2025 - Comments Off on Digital Nation Pakistan Bill 2024: DRF Analysis and Recommendations

Digital Nation Pakistan Bill 2024: DRF Analysis and Recommendations

Context:

On 16 December, 2024, the Minister of State for IT Shaza Fatima tabled[1] the Digital Nation Pakistan Bill 2024[2] (“Bill”) in the National Assembly (NA). The proposed Bill aims to facilitate the formation of digital identity for citizens and centralize social, economic, and governance data. The digital identity is expected to include data about a citizen’s health, assets, and other social indicators. Furthermore, the Bill proposes to create three bodies[3] including a high-powered National Digital Commission (NDC), to be chaired by the Prime Minister, a Strategic Oversight Committee (SOC), and a Pakistan Digital Authority (PDA). Reportedly, NDC will “set the strategic vision and policy framework for the country's digital transformation.” Furthermore, PDA will “implement these policies by coordinating and harmonizing digital initiatives across all levels of government.” Lastly, SOC will provide oversight on the work on PDA. Reportedly, the Bill has been prepared under the World Bank’s US$78 million Digital Economy Enhancement Project (DEEP)[4]. It will likely enable the creation of a centralized digital infrastructure by 14 August, 2025 and all existing databases would be linked to it.

The bill has received widespread criticism from digital rights advocates, industry and parliamentarians, with some urging the government to consult all stakeholders before rushing through the legislation. On the other hand, IT Minister Shaza has defended the bill, terming it a “historic initiative” that would “eliminate red tape”.

The bill has been referred to the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on IT for further consultation. In terms of the next steps, it has to be tabled in the National Assembly again if new changes are incorporated into the existing draft. Once approved by the NA, it will then have to be tabled and approved by the Senate, before it is sent to the President for formal assent and becomes an Act. It is unclear how soon the government will move it through the parliament.


Concerns pertaining to the Bill:

  1. No Prior consultation with civil society: The proposed initiative will transform the way citizens interact with the state and will have huge implications for human rights as well as the digital economy. Civil society organisations were not given a chance to provide inputs during the drafting of the bill or share any solutions to address any human rights concerns pertaining to the proposed Digital ID framework. Furthermore, the World Bank did not initiate such a consultation while providing input to the government. It is also unclear what advice was sent to the government by the World Bank on the proposed framework. Global civil society organisations had long urged the Bank to consult human rights groups while facilitating the launch of such ID systems globally. An open letter[5] in this regard was also issued in 2022 that called for human rights impact assessments of digital ID systems. Additionally, in the governance bodies, there is no representation of ordinary citizens or civil society.
  2. Overlapping Agenda: The proposed authorities in the bill seem to share many of the ambitions on digital development for which there already exist autonomous bodies such as the National Information and Technology Board[6] and provincial technology boards. It is unclear why a new set of authorities are needed to design and implement a “National Digital Masterplan”, as per Sections 11 and 12 of the Bill,  given the presence of existing bodies with similar mandates and areas of focus. The Act also contains broad definitions for terms like "digital economy," "digital governance," and "emerging technologies," which may lead to overlapping responsibilities across agencies or entities, causing inefficiencies.
  3. Austerity Vs Efficiency: The new Bill proposes the creation of a new authority called the Pakistan Digital Authority (PDA). The PDA will monitor implementation, assess compliance, and report progress to the NDC (Section 12(2)). However, there are no timelines for these processes, which will pose a risk of delays and ineffective implementation. Further, the current draft of the Bill proposes that the PM will appoint the three members of the authority and they may be eligible to open new offices. The creation of new authority with overlapping agenda may not be a good use of government resources at a time when the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb are spearheading an austerity drive that will likely lead to abolishing at least 82 government departments[7] at the federal level and also include a few in the IT Ministry. Finance Minister Aurangzeb in particular criticised[8] the need for creating the NDC and PDA, urging instead for the use of current technological infrastructure.
  4. Data Protection Bill Vs Digital Nation Pakistan Bill: The proposal of a centralised digital infrastructure amid multiple incidents of massive data breaches and the absence of a data protection framework raise serious concerns around the government's capability to effectively manage data security of a centralised infrastructure. In various jurisdictions across the globe, a clearly laid out data protection framework and an autonomous data protection authority is essential to providing clarity around safety of the citizens’ data. Without a strong legal framework , a digital ID system runs the risk of highly sensitive data breaches with no mechanism for redressal and accountability, as has already been noted extensively in the case of data breaches in Aadhaar (India’s digital ID system) by CSOs such as Privacy International[9]. Given the proposed masterplan under this Bill is likely to increase data processing of citizens’ data from various government departments, the next step towards enhanced digitalization is a Data Protection law, not a DNPB at this stage. Unless citizens have clarity on the accountability mechanisms pertaining to their data, creating additional authorities with powers to handle citizen data would create uncertainty among citizens. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted universally acclaimed data protection frameworks such as GDPR[10] in the EU, Sri Lanka’s Registration of Persons Act[11] in South Asia, and the Philippines’ Data Privacy Act of 2012[12].  It is positive to note that the IT Ministry is already working on the bill and has been provided with feedback from all the stakeholders, especially from the digital economy and the human rights lens.
  5. Internet connectivity challenges: Additionally, the effectiveness of the digital identity system relies heavily on reliable internet connectivity, which remains inaccessible to more than half of the population. Even those with access have complained of poor internet quality and intermittent disruptions with no clear explanation from the government on how soon the internet connectivity would improve. Reportedly, Pakistan’s internet speeds were rated among the lowest 12% of the countries.[13] In such a situation, a centralized digital ID framework is likely to exacerbate the digital divide and deprive half of the population from the services it aims to offer.
  6. Sweeping powers, Lack of Accountability and Judicial Oversight: Sections 28 and 29 of the Bill raise serious concerns by giving unchecked power to the authorities enforcing it. By stipulating under Section 29 that “no decision or action taken under this Act or rules" or regulations made thereunder shall be questioned by any agency or challenged in any court or tribunal, nor shall any injunction be granted against such decisions or actions”, the law shuts the door for accountability, removes judicial scrutiny, and violates the principle of checks and balances.  This prohibition further conflicts with constitutional guarantees, such as the right to due process, as it bars seeking legal remedies against potential abuses of power. The lack of oversight and barring injunctions will risk arbitrary decision-making and misuse of powers. It could also discourage foreign businesses and investors who prefer strong legal safeguards. Moreover, section 28 giving this Bill an overriding power over other laws will threaten existing or future right-based protections, like those for privacy or data protections. Concerningly, the Strategic Oversight Committee (SOC), established under Section 9 of the Bill, which claims to be an independent body, will be chaired by the IT Minister, effectively rendering its independence and autonomy compromised. For instance, Cambodia set up a monitoring body called the National Steering Committee on CRVS and Identification (NSCI) under its National Strategic Plan of Identification (2017-2026) that includes civil society representation apart from members of multiple government ministries[14].
  7. Concerns around the Bureaucratic Composition of Proposed Authorities:  The establishment of three governance bodies in the Bill raises concerns regarding power concentration, accountability, and operational effectiveness. Firstly, the NDC, chaired by the Prime Minister and made up of political leaders, centralizes decision-making, which could lead to politicized decisions. NDA is composed of 17 members, including the Prime Minister, key federal ministers, and all four provincial chief ministers. This composition raises concerns about the practicality and functionality of the commission. For instance, holding meetings could be challenging with this centralized structure of the high-level membership, resulting in delays in decision-making, and difficulties in coordinating across various levels of government. The sustainability of such a structure over time may be questioned, given the complexities of aligning federal and provincial interests within a single body. Secondly, though the PDA does have administrative and financial powers, it does not appear to have true autonomy, as any appointments will be made by the Prime Minister, who also has the authority to remove persons “for reasons to be recorded” (Section 7(6)), in the absence of voluntary resignation. Lastly, the SOC, according to the Bill, will promote accountability through monitoring the PDA’s performance and providing independent reviews. Its purview for thorough external oversight could be limited, however, given that it will be answering to the NDC. The language of the Bill does not indicate or address any clear mechanism for conflict resolution between these bodies or the federal and provincial stakeholders involved.
  8. Unclear Funding Mechanism: There are many vague sources of the "Digital Nation Fund," like government allocations, grants, and loans, but no mechanism for securing and sustaining these funds. Getting an annual allocation from the Finance Ministry will be a challenge.

 

Recommendations:

  1. Human Rights Risk Audit: Prior to and during the implementation of a digital ID system under the Digital Nation Pakistan Bill (2024), a human rights risk audit conducted by independent experts is necessary. This audit will comprise contextual and baseline analyses, independent rights-focused evaluations, and cost-benefit audits that take into account political, social, and economic dynamics. Funding and resources must be allocated to such an audit . The audit team should be independent from the World Bank or government to avoid conflict of interests.
  2. Create opportunities for sustained, high-level engagement with civil society and other experts: In the review stage of the Bill, the government must facilitate inclusive multistakeholder fora by holding open and transparent dialogue with civil society, experts, and other stakeholders. These fora should enable the evaluation of current systems and potential implementations across various sectors, including trade, healthcare, and migration management.
  3. Enact a Human Rights compliant data protection bill: The government should prioritize the passage of a rights-respecting data protection law instead of the proposed Bill, with clear guidelines on how data will be collected, stored, and used, alongside strict protocols for consent mechanisms, data security, and accountability. In parallel, given the centralization of data, there must be proper implementation of cybersecurity measures, including checks on access controls and regular assessments.
  4. Cyber Security of Centralized Data Systems: Refrain from establishing digital ID systems as a centralized repository that government officials or private actors can easily access without limitations, particularly if the digital ID system includes biometric data. Access to the data should be strictly limited, and law enforcement access should be predicated on a warrant issued by an independent judicial authority. All data collection, processing, and storage must instead be decentralised, and distributed across multiple locations or systems instead of relying on a single, centralized database. Capacity building in cybersecurity infrastructure is possible for Pakistan through collaboration with international organisations and experts, enhanced public funding, and public-private partnerships.
  5. Develop a legal framework with robust transparency and oversight mechanisms: The government must develop robust legal frameworks to govern the operation, use, and access of digital ID systems. These frameworks must classify citizen data by sensitivity—particularly protecting biometric, financial, and medical data under strict guidelines inspired by international standards such as the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), United Kingdom Digital Identity and Attributes Trust Framework (UK DIATF), United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (US HIPAA), and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).

    Section 29 of the Digital Nation Pakistan Bill 2024 which provides blanket immunity provisions that undermine transparency and accountability, must be amended to allow for limited judicial review. Any oversight mechanisms must be independent, and must include accessible grievance processes to address rights violations, gain public trust, and protect against potential abuses of power.

  6. Ensure Digital ID systems are inclusive: The proposed Bill risks excluding marginalized communities due to limited internet access in rural and underdeveloped areas such as Gilgit-Baltistan and Balochistan. The framework does not address how these regions will be accommodated. The government should make significant investments to expand broadband and 5G infrastructure, leveraging public-private partnerships and government subsidies. A good model to follow can be India’s BharatNet[15], which aims to provide broadband access to 250,000 villages for e-health, e-education, and e-governance. Policies should be designed to incentivize ISPs to reduce service costs in underserved areas alongside launching digital literacy campaigns to empower citizens.
    Further, the framework must delink digital IDs from legal status, following examples like the World Bank-funded Nigeria Digital Identification for Development Project. This allows refugees, migrant workers, and stateless persons to access essential services without barriers.
    The Bill should include periodic appraisals pertaining to digital inclusivity, annual progress reports to Parliament, and a clear timeline for infrastructure development with robust accountability mechanisms.
  7. Ensure Strategic Oversight Committee (SOC) is fully independent: As highlighted in the concerns above, the proposed establishment of the Strategic Oversight Committee (SOC) as an independent and autonomous body consisting of private sectoral representation with the aim of legally enabled input is hindered by the fact that it will be chaired by the IT Minister. In order to ensure the independence of this body, there must be no involvement of government officials in the Committee.

[1] https://www.dawn.com/news/1879138

[2] https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6760344aeafac_156.pdf

[3] https://www.geo.tv/latest/579958-digital-nation-pakistan-bill-tabled-in-na-to-establish-unified-identity-for-citizens

[4] https://www.brecorder.com/news/40338210/talks-on-digital-nation-bill-inconclusive

[5] https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-letter-to-the-world-bank-digital-id-systems/

[6] https://www.nitb.gov.pk/

[7] https://www.dawn.com/news/1855153

[8] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2495476/ministers-object-to-creation-of-more-authorities

[9] https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/2299/initial-analysis-indian-supreme-court-decision-aadhaar#:~:text=The%20court%20has%20demanded%20that,for%20government%20grants%2C%20and%20schools

[10] https://gdpr.eu/

[11] https://www.srilankalaw.lk/r/1018-registration-of-persons-act.html

[12] https://privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/

[13] https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.dawn.com/news/1882236/the-year-they-came-for-the-internet&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1736247757914673&usg=AOvVaw0DwtDZoKi3rpzmLbVr9jIZ

[14] https://greaterinternetfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Regional-Report_South-and-Southeast-Asia.pdf

[15] https://www.akalinfo.com/blog/bharatnet/

December 17, 2024 - Comments Off on Limits on data scraping—Terrible news for social media research and platform accountability?

Limits on data scraping—Terrible news for social media research and platform accountability?

Early last year, following Elon Musk’s takeover, X (formerly Twitter) introduced paid API access tiers, dealing a deathblow to its long-standing role as a uniquely valuable resource for academic research.

APIs, or Application Programming Interfaces, act as bridges that connect two software applications, enabling data exchange. For instance, an API can be used to request data from X and store it in a structured format like a CSV file. Paid API tiers mean that the previous official Twitter/X API is no longer functional, which further means data cannot be scraped from X for free.

This measure, alongside introducing ‘rate limits’ (limits to the number of tweets users could view per day), was ostensibly taken to prevent what Musk referred to in a July 2023 tweet as “...extreme levels of data scraping & system manipulation…”, which were slowing down the site and hindering the user experience. However, no further explanation was provided by Musk to support the claim of “extreme levels of data scraping”. X users pointed out that if these indeed exist, they would likely manifest as anomalies that can be identified as request spikes, and thus easily narrowed down to identify and ban users requesting abnormally large amounts of data.

Unreasonably priced paid API tiers

Nevertheless, Musk’s crackdown on data scraping continued, and as of now there are four API tiers: free, basic, pro, and enterprise. The free tier allows 100 reads per month, a negligible amount for researchers and academics looking to analyse posts on X for meaningful insights, patterns, and key data points. The most affordable paid tier only offers around “0.3 percent of [data] [third parties] previously had free access to in a single day”, with  enterprise tier prices shooting to upwards of $42,000 per month. It is also impossible to read posts without being logged into X.

X’s crackdowns on data scraping

As a means to enforce these measures, X has regularly been cracking down on third-party API access, blocking IP addresses and mass suspending developer accounts, and bringing costly lawsuits against non-profits whose research utilises data scraped from X without authorised access.While one might believe Musk’s policies aim to combat misuse and preserve platform integrity, the fact that X, a year after introducing paid API tiers, amended its terms of service to permit training its generative AI model on user posts without their consent makes such intentions harder to trust.

The value of data scraping to social media research

These recent and ongoing changes to X’s policies represent a strange and worrying landscape for data accessibility in academic research. Academic researchers have long relied on X’s open model and public data for producing valuable medical research, including enriching datasets for cancer treatment methods, and tracking mental health trends during public health emergencies like COVID-19.

In addition to X, scraped data across platforms has also been used to collect evidence for studies that have offered positive benefits to society, such as uncovering illegal markets for adopted children on Yahoo bulletin boards, revealing overlaps between law enforcement and extremist Facebook groups, and identifying problems with TikTok’s algorithm targeting youth. From the digital rights lens, this model has improved understanding of the implications of harmful online content for society and provided the rights community an opportunity to share policy recommendations. Without it, tracking social media companies’ adherence to their own content moderation rules for regulating harmful content is increasingly challenging.

To the dismay of researchers, X is not the only platform that restricts access to their API. Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn, have long restricted access to user data.

The legal debate around scraping public data

Legally, social media companies like X and LinkedIn have come under fire for bringing claims against the scraping of public data on their platforms. In X Corp. v. Bright Data Ltd. (2024), X Corp asserted breach-of-contract and tort claims against a data scraping company, Bright Data, to prevent it from extracting and copying public data from X, and selling tools that enable users to extract and copy public data from the same.

The case was ultimately dismissed because none of the claims passed muster, and in its ruling the U.S. district court quoted a previous judgement for a case brought by LinkedIn against data scraping by an airline website in 2022:

…giving social media companies ‘free rein to decide, on any basis, who can collect and use data - data that the companies do not own, that they otherwise make publicly available to viewers, and that the companies themselves collect and use - risks the possible creation of information monopolies that would disserve the public interest.’

HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) qtd. in X Corp. v. Bright Data Ltd., C 23-03698 WHA, 2 (N.D. Cal. May. 9, 2024)

These recent court rulings highlight the risks posed to public interest by the arbitrary crackdown on data scraping. They underscore how social media platforms hold “arms length”, non-exclusive rights to user data, and have no written exclusive copyright license over user’s works. Users own sole exclusive rights to their data, and only owners of exclusive rights can seek protection and remedies from courts. Litigation brought by X against data scraping of public data is an overreach of its rights, as explained in the X Corp. v. Bright Data case judgement:

…invoking state contract and tort law, X Corp. would entrench its own private copyright system that rivals, even conflicts with, the actual copyright system enacted by Congress. X Corp. would yank into its private domain and hold for sale information open to all, exercising a copyright owner's right to exclude where it has no such right.

X Corp. v. Bright Data Ltd., C 23-03698 WHA, 2 (N.D. Cal. May. 9, 2024)

Tools that bypass data scraping restrictions

Irrespective of legal woes and crackdowns, developers have started building third-party tools, which allow users, including researchers, to ‘informally’ scrape data from social media platforms.

These tools avoid the hassle of requiring official API access from platforms by mimicking human browsing behavior to extract data instead of relying on APIs. Since many of these tools offer low-code and no-code solutions to data scraping, they expand the user base of a practice that was in the past only limited to programmers with at least an intermediate understanding of Python and other programming languages. Now the layperson or researcher also has a wealth of data at their fingertips. Additionally, in the case of X, some of these tools allow for access to historic data going back to 2006, which even the official X API does not offer. At the same time, their unofficial status leaves these tools at a constant risk of bans, and open to litigation, making them unreliable options for long-term research.

How platforms can address data scraping responsibly

As such, the most practical, reliable, and legal option would be for platforms to address their duty towards offering researchers above-board methodologies to continue their noble and essential aim of knowledge production. Blanket bans on data scraping are not a one-size-fits-all solution. It is necessary to consider context and intent of use for each instance of scraping. It is true that the open web runs the risk of being ‘spidered’ by massive web crawlers that not only require massive bandwidth and overload servers, but are also being used to train Large Language Models (LLMs) without user and website owner consent. This is and should be a genuine cause of concern for tech companies and other stakeholders. At the same time, as discussed in detail above, data scraping specific sites and pages has time and again proven to be useful, valuable, and in need of protection.

For some skeptics, the problem then is not data scraping, but platforms evading accountability when it comes to contextualising use cases for data scraping. Legitimate, positive use cases can be identified by looking at research objectives, the size of data collection, and the use of appropriate safeguards to protect data and sites. By facilitating researchers with authorised free access for these legitimate use cases, platforms can reduce unofficial scraping on their sites, while also upholding their duties towards the public good. Putting significant amounts of data behind unbreachable paywalls, regardless of its intended use, represents a fundamental failure of platform accountability in supporting essential research and knowledge production.

 

By Sara Imran, Research Associate, Digital Rights Foundation

November 5, 2024 - Comments Off on Online Gendered Violence against trans community in Pakistan: Dolphin Ayan Khan Case

Online Gendered Violence against trans community in Pakistan: Dolphin Ayan Khan Case

DRF investigates the dissemination of harmful content on social media platforms against transgender community member Dolphin Khan and identifies gaps in the implementation of platforms’ content moderation rules

Trigger Warnings: Discussions of Non-consensual Nudity, Threats of Bodily Harm, Technology-Facilitated Gendered Violence, Blurred/Obscured screenshots from a non-consensual video (for information purposes).

Context:

Pakistan’s transgender community has persistently experienced violence, ostracization at the societal level, and sexual exploitation over the years. In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone, 267 cases of violence against the transgender community were reported during 2019-2023, but which resulted in only one conviction. To make matters worse, the community has long been a victim of online hate on social media platforms. In October 2024, DRF released “Gendered Disinformation in South Asia Case Study - Pakistan, which focused on the discrimination and online hate speech directed at Pakistan’s trans community. According to the report, it was found that at least 22% of harmful social media posts (including TFGBV, gendered disinformation, gendered hate speech)  were aimed at the transgender community. However, as the report noted, meetings and escalations with social media platforms concerning trans-specific hate speech were unsatisfactory, owing to the latter’s responses - or, in the case of X, largely unresponsive post-change in ownership.

Dolphin Khan Case:

On 29 October, a non-consensual video of a Pakistani trans woman was leaked online, with users on multiple social media platforms sharing it. The video, which the victim Dolphin Ayan Khan - also known as Dolphin Ayaan - has described as being “forcibly recorded”, shows her being forced to strip down entirely and dance, by someone in the background who can be heard but not seen by the viewer, after being abducted at gunpoint.

On the back of this incident, transgender rights activist Dr. Mehrub Awan brought the video to everyone’s attention on X on 30 October. Expressing disdain towards the persistent harassment of the trans community, Dr. Awan stressed:

 “...We have literally written papers, done podcasts, book chapters, and spoken to media and officials about “Beela violence” and how organised it is. We, ourselves, have presented data and identified hotspots - Mardan and Peshawar - and profiled the criminals involved. We have done everything that we, as a broken and battered community, could do. Ayyan (sic) was on the roads just a month ago organizing protests, and a year ago injured with bullets. When does this end? What else is expected from a community literally on the receiving end of genocidal murders in Pakhtunkhwa to do?”

Following the incident, Ms. Khan issued a video statement naming the alleged perpetrator behind the video and confirming that police authorities had been informed about the incident. Seeking  justice on the matter, she vowed to hold a press conference on this issue in November. According to news reports, on 01 November a case against the perpetrators of the video - which was filmed in 2023 - was filed in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA).

Harmful Content On  Social Media Platforms: DRF’s findings

DRF conducted preliminary investigations into the matter to understand whether or not these videos were available on social media platforms especially X, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube and Tiktok. Social media platforms were reviewed on 31 October between 0900 AM-0300 PM, using the search terms “Dolphin Khan”, “Dolphin Ayan”, and “Dolphin Ayan Khan”. Owing to capacity and time constraints, DRF was unable to look at other platforms such as WhatsApp/Snack Video or Snapchat.

  • Non-consensual nude content:
    As per initial investigations, it was found that at least two accounts on X had reportedly posted clips of the actual video. However, none of these video clips were posted or available on Facebook, Tiktok or Instagram. Furthermore, DRF came across at least two concrete instances where a link shared by an account on X led to an uncensored video being hosted on at least two different pornographic websites (screenshots provided, but with URLs removed and images blurred). As of the 31 of October, these X profiles were still up, and with active links.
    Platform rules on non-consensual video:
    The availability of Dolphin’s non-consensual videos on X are in violation of X’s non-consensual nudity policy. It underscores how users cannot “post or share intimate photos or videos of someone that were produced or distributed without their consent.” In violation of these policies, an account can either be suspended or temporarily locked.
    While the accounts posting Dolphin’s videos had not been suspended at the time of data gathering, it was unclear if they were locked or not.  Irrespective of the restrictions, merely locking an account without removing the harmful post seemed an ineffective strategy in this case. DRF’s Cyber Harassment Helpline in the past has recorded similar incidents like these where transgender activists had their pictures/videos shared on the platform which were in violation of this policy, and yet had not been removed by the platform.

Accounts on X actively sharing clips from the leaked non-consensual video

 

Example of users on X sharing an external link to a pornographic website that is hosting the video in question

  • Posts containing malicious links:
    Multiple social media accounts on Facebook and X collectively were luring users towards suspected malicious web links that offered full access to the video of Ms. Khan which leads to a non-conformity of a second violation of policies of these platforms.  In the case of X, DRF found at least eight unique accounts that purported to offer full access to the video and at least one account that made three posts with different images, but linking out to the same spam or suspicious link, as indicated in the screenshots in this report. Similarly on Facebook, DRF came across at least ten unique accounts that claimed to offer full access to the video, but with each sharing the same screenshots. One Facebook account made at least two posts that offered the same spam or suspicious link, and another with a slightly different account name that shared the same spam or suspicious link.  Similarly, On YouTube, DRF found at least one example of someone purporting to offer the video in full in their comment section (with a censored screenshot), only to find it link out to a spam website (this appears to be this particular YouTube account’s modus operandi, as an attempt to garner views/likes, for different sorts of videos). No such posts containing suspected malicious links were found on Instagram or Tiktok within the time period under investigation, at the time of this report.


Example of users on X sharing suspected malicious web links

It is unclear whether all of the links observed lead to active executions of malware, and requires further investigation. As per initial investigations into a few links found on X and Facebook, it was found that clicking on a link within said posts would redirect users to external websites that would  install or attempt to install software, adult material or other unexpected programmes. This is a common malware redistribution tactic that can trick people into downloading harmful software posed as legitimate (if unethical and hateful) material. Furthermore, VirusTotal also found these links to be suspicious or malicious.

 

 

Platform rules on malicious links:

Social media platforms have slightly different rules when it comes to regulating accounts posting suspicious links. Meta’s policy on Cyber Security prohibits “Attempts to share, develop, host, or distribute malicious or harmful code…” Such accounts would be suspended with or without a warning. Similarly, YouTube accounts posting suspected malicious links are in violation of YouTube’s policies concerning “external links”. Youtube violations - whether this pertains to malicious or suspicious links - will be subject to a three strike system: strike one, where an account is suspended for one week; strike two, where the account is suspended for two weeks (if within 90 days of the first strike); strike three, which, if occurring in the 90 day period mentioned, will lead to termination. On the other hand, X’s policies are less restrictive but only state that the platform “may take action to limit the spread” of “malicious links that could steal personal information or harm electronic devices” or spam “links that disrupt their experience.

Thus, the accounts posting malicious links on Meta and YouTube will be liable to be suspended (with or without a warning) but those on X cannot be suspended as long as the links’  outreach is limited by X. In theory, the accounts posted on Youtube and Meta should have been suspended at least for posting suspected malicious links and those on X would have their reach limited. However, the content moderation measures in place seemed insufficient in this case to protect the users from potentially harmful software.

In order to timely raise awareness about the presence of suspected malicious links on platforms, DRF’s Executive Director Nighat Dad posted on Facebook and instagram, warning about a profile sharing these links especially on X. However, her Facebook post was taken down by Meta within hours, claiming that the post violated Community Standards regarding Cybersecurity. Interestingly, the same post was not removed from Instagram.  Reflecting on the experience, Nighat noted:

“While my story only aimed at warning users against harmful content that itself violated the platform’s rules, it looks like the automated checking system highlighted my post on Facebook as problematic and removed it but not on Instagram.”

Conclusion:

Transgender women in Pakistan are extremely susceptible to violence, as already noted in DRF’s case study on gendered disinformation in South Asia. The transgender community in Pakistan has been subjected to offline violence, accusations of blasphemy and economic harm which has been perpetuated with orchestrated campaigns like these by using trans individuals non-consensual images to call for more harm and violence. Trans individuals acceptance within society is under constant threat and the rise in targeted attacks against them has already led to a question mark around their rights as a citizen of Pakistan.. The Federal Shariat Court judgement striking down important sections of the Transgender (Protection of Rights) Act 2018 pertaining to self identity and later the National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) temporarily halting issuing identity cards for the community grows to show the systematic and institutional violence that the community faces due to these disinformation campaigns online.

In Pakistan, non-consensual intimate and nude images are weaponized against women and gendered minorities. DRF’s Cyber Harassment Helpline has over time highlighted to platforms that these visuals cause imminent harm to transgender individuals and in most instances can lead to offline violence. Despite platforms prioritising this type of content that causes imminent physical harm, platforms’ approach with its automated content moderation policies leaves this harmful content online.

In recent trends in cases of gender based violence it has been witnessed that victims facing graphic violence and threats are filmed and photographed during the violence as an act of authority and intimidation towards the victims. The presence of harmful content on social media platforms in Dolphin Khan’s case is a reminder of these challenges and growing trends pertaining to regulating harmful content from social media platforms. Irrespective of the posts’ wider reach on the platforms, anyone curiously looking for Dolphin’s videos could have found them on X. Furthermore, they would have also been vulnerable to malicious links not only on X but also on Facebook and Youtube. Thus, merely locking or warning accounts for violating community standards might not be enough to proactively protect users from harmful content.

As technology is exacerbating technology facilitated gender based violence (TFGBV) and the degrees of violence of graphic harms are becoming more frequent and dangerous, platforms need to identify these patterns and look at non-consensual visuals in the global south from an intersectional lens particularly ensuring rapid and quick response mechanisms to deal with this problem. DRF will continue to work with platforms to highlight these challenges and ensure that online spaces are safe for users across all demographics.

 

September 11, 2024 - Comments Off on Digital Rights Foundation’s Comment Posts that include “From The River To The Sea”

Digital Rights Foundation’s Comment Posts that include “From The River To The Sea”

Digital Rights Foundation Research and Policy Department 

21-5-2024

In November 2023, following the events of October 7th there was a surge in posts online containing the phrase “From the River to the Sea” - a phrase used by people across the world to show their support for Palestine. The complete slogan, “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free” is a reference to the land across the historical state of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. The slogan has been used since the 1960s by Palestinian nationalist and resistance groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Hamas. Over time the phrase has become increasingly popular among Palestinians, and Palestinian diaspora around the world as it speaks to their personal ties to the land. Many identify themselves strongly with the village or town they or their ancestors come from, stretching across the land, from Jericho and Safed near the Jordan River, to Jaffa and Haifa on the shores of the Mediterranean sea. 

As the phrase is used globally by different actors, the context and intent varies depending on who is using it. Despite that, the chant is mostly used to support and empower the struggle of all Palestinians, regardless of religion, striving for a free and sovereign homeland. However, there have been instances where variations of the phrase have been used to support the movement for a Greater Israel. For example, the founding charter of Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party states: “Between the sea and the Jordan River there will only be Israeli sovereignty”. In 1977, their platform called for Israeli sovereignty over the land between Jordan and the Mediterranean sea, openly demanding complete annexation of the West Bank

The chant can be equated to the commonly supported ideology for a ‘Greater Israel’ - an Israeli Jewish state that extends from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. If we consider Palestinian usage of the chant for liberation as a call for the expulsion of Jews from the region, then in all fairness, the same should hold true for a call for a Greater Israel. It is no secret that the current Israeli government and those that came before have supported the complete annihilation and expulsion of Palestinians from the land. Supporters of the zionist ideology perceive the chant as a violent call because it threatens their vision of a solely Jewish state. The liberation of Palestine means that Israel will have to treat Palestinian Arabs and Israelis as equal citizens, adding millions of Palestinian Arabs to their citizenship rolls - a decision that goes against their aim of establishing a Greater Israel, diminishing the “Jewishness” of the state.

  In the past claims have been made that the slogan is antisemitic, however in truth the slogan and its use reflect a long history of attempts to silence Palestinian voices and those speaking in solidarity. Palestinian-American writer Yousef Munayyer argues that those who perceive “From the River to the Sea” to have genocidal connotations or any desire for the destruction of Israel, were simply reflective of their own Islamophobia. He argues that the phrase was instead merely used to express people's desire for a state where “Palestinians can live in their homeland as free and equal citizens, neither dominated by others nor dominating others.” Some Palestinians say that the slogan refers to a single state where Palestinians and Israelis can live together, and not as a call to remove anyone from the region. According to Rama Al Malah, an organizer with the Palestinian Youth Movement, the chant in no way calls for the killing of Jewish people but is a way for them to say that they want liberation from 75 years of occupation, and to advocate for the return of refugees who have been forced out of their land from 1948 till now. 

Now that the intended use of the phrase through online and offline platforms is established, it is important to highlight how Meta’s policies and content moderation practices have been heavily censoring content relating to Palestine since October 7th, 2023. Users across the globe have reported that the content they share that is pro-Palestine is being ‘shadow-banned’, limiting their reach and engagement on the platforms. Users have also reported the removal of pro-Palestine content from the platform after being flagged for ‘violating community guidelines’.When content regarding conflict areas is removed by Meta from its platforms, the risk of erasure of crucial evidence to be used in international criminal courts for prosecuting perpetrators increases. In addition to silencing voices that advocate for Palestinian rights, the deletion of the phrase “From the River to the Sea” among other pro-Palestine content creates gaps in potential digital evidence on human rights violations. As per Leiden guidelines, digitally derived evidence including photographs, social media content and videos is being increasingly used as documented evidence in international criminal prosecutions. The UN Fact-Finding mission using Facebook posts as evidence in the case of brutalities against Myanmar’s Rohingya population is one such example that signifies the crucial role played by social media platforms for the preservation of records. Similarly, Meta’s removal of content related to the Palestine-Israel conflict, in any capacity, creates a dent in the repository that has the potential to serve as crucial evidence for legal decision-making against violations within conflict zones.   

According to a report by Human Rights Watch from October to November 2023, there have been 1050 takedowns on Instagram and Facebook relating to Pro Palestinian content. Of the 1050 takedowns, written primarily in the English language from over 60 countries, 1049 cases contained peaceful content in solidarity with Palestinians. Since the October 7 conflict, there has been a surge in hateful content against Palestinians on social media platforms. 7amleh’s AI-powered language model has been monitoring the spread of hate speech in Hebrew against Palestinians and pro-Palestine users on these platforms. Since October the model has classified 6,026,492 hateful and violent cases on platforms. The distribution of violence according to the tool has been the highest on X (79.7%) followed by Meta platforms (19.1%). Additionally, it is difficult to overlook Meta’s biased approach towards pro-Palestinian content on the platform when in October 2023 Meta started inserting the word ‘terrorist’ into profile bios of Palestinian users on Instagram; later issuing an apology stating that the platform was experiencing a bug in auto-translation on Instagram. Previously, Meta’s track record in the May 2021 crisis between Israel and Palestine showed a similar pattern when Palestinian voices were censored and shadow-banned on the platform, as was later confirmed by the Sustainable Business Network and Consultancy (BSR) report. The continuous removal of pro-Palestine content on the platform indicates that Meta has repeatedly censored the voices of users on its platform even before the events of October 9. Post-October 9, the censorship has been further aggravated by big tech platforms. 

Meta’s handling of Palestinian content, particularly the removal of pages such as Eye of Palestine and the suspension of Palestinian journalist Motaz Azaiza’s account, raises serious concerns about the platform’s commitment to human rights and freedom of speech on the platform. Despite Meta’s newsworthy policy, which protects journalistic content, these accounts have faced undue restrictions and reach limitations. This biased enforcement is in stark contrast with Meta’s approach during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where the platform displayed clear bias by promoting content favoring and showing solidarity with Ukraine. This discrepancy underscores an inconsistency in Meta’s content moderation practices, undermining principles of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and equality and non-discrimination. Although Meta has since issued an apology for its unfair treatment of Palestinian solidarity voices, the platform persists in limiting content that supports Palestine, further perpetuating digital apartheid and the use of social media algorithms that disproportionately impact marginalized voices. This ongoing issue highlights a significant gap between Meta’s stated policies and its actions, calling into question its commitment to upholding human rights responsibilities.

In its recent policy changes, Meta has introduced new default limits on political content, weakening free expression online by disproportionately affecting political content from marginalized groups. The time and context of this particular policy raise questions about the potentially biased approach of the platform in controlling narratives. This not only undermines democratic values of free speech and association but also exacerbates existing inequalities, particularly for voices supporting the Palestinian plight. The biased application of Meta’s policies reflects a broader trend of digital discrimination, where algorithmic decisions and content moderation policies reinforce existing power imbalances and suppress dissenting voices. Meta’s inconsistent and biased handling of Palestinian content, coupled with its preferential treatment of other geopolitical issues, not only raises grave concerns around adherence to global human rights principles but also potentially undermines systematic freedom of expression, freedom of association, and non-discrimination. Tech platforms need to create more transparent and equitable content moderation policies that are sensitive to contextual nuances.

Meta’s response to the phrase “From the river to the sea” on its platform revolves around several key human rights principles. Facebook, as a platform with 3.03 billion monthly active users, has the responsibility to protect the fundamental human rights of its user base. This includes allowing individuals to express political opinions, advocate for political changes, express solidarity with a cause and ensure equality and non-discrimination. The cases highlight contexts where the aim of the phrase “From the river to the sea” is to advocate peacefully for Palestinian civil rights without promoting violence or hatred towards people under protected characteristics. Upon reviewing the content mentioning the phrase on Meta platforms, it was found that a large majority of it only mentions and sympathizes with Palestinians with no discussion being anti-semitic or anti-Israel. The question that arises is in a case where the world has seen the extent of atrocities that Palestinians have been subjected to, are expressing personal opinions around the current crisis considered promoting terrorism on platforms? Many Palestinian activists have expressed that the complete phrase “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” does not insult or violate the sovereignty of the state of Israel, the Jewish community, or Meta’s content moderation policies. Through a more subjective perspective where the phrase is used critically against state institutions, Meta does not categorize the use of the phrase as hate speech, particularly when the phrase is against state institutions rather than any specific recognized individuals. In all three cases, the phrase has been provided more context with additional text, for example “#DefundIsrael”, “Zionist State of Israel”, and “Zionist Israeli occupiers”, highlighting the cases as an association with a political cause rather than to support any dangerous organizations (as categorized by Meta and/or the United States Government). Although the cause is controversial in the current global political landscape, the phrase and its use in these cases do not violate Meta’s community guidelines on “Hate speech”. The first case where the user claimed the phrase “violates Meta’s policies prohibiting content that promotes violence or supports terrorism” refers to Meta’s rules on “Violence and incitement”, “Dangerous Organizations” and Individuals. The phrase “From the river to the sea” is used to show solidarity with Palestinians in general, rather than an affiliation with any political or resistance group. None of the cases presented by the Oversight Board insinuate or show affiliation and alliance, or promote dangerous organizations. Moreover, Meta’s categorization of dangerous organizations needs further transparency and context. The issue of contextual categorization of keywords and associations has been a long-standing debate, especially with Meta’s content moderation policies. For a platform that deems its policies global and standardized for every country, specifically using “United States designated terrorist organizations” contradicts their global policies agenda. These policies need more robust and inclusive parameters to be globally inclusive throughout different regions. Moreover, the categorizations of “Dangerous organizations” should be transparently communicated with Meta’s trusted partners to make them aware of the kind of content that should be escalated to Meta.

These cases are a testament to addressing the contextual application of Meta’s community standards. Ideally, there should be no room for specific targeting of any religious groups thus anti-semitic content should be taken down right away, however in cases where the content is associated with a peaceful socio-political movement, the content should be left up as it does not go against any of Meta’s content moderation guidelines. Hence, the three cases should not be removed from the platform as long as they have been posted in solidarity with a political cause and are categorized as freedom of speech and freedom of association. 

The use of the phrase has also been widely scrutinized at the state and educational institutions level. The phrase was labeled antisemitic by the US House of Representatives in a resolution that was passed with a 377 majority against 44 who voted against it in January 2024. US Representative Rashida Tlaib was censured by the House of Representatives through a resolution as a consequence of her using the phrase on social media. Several House Republicans and Democrats came together to condemn the pro-Palestine statements of the only Palestinian-origin representative. According to them, the phrase’s genocidal nature encourages the eradication of the state of Israel. It is important to note that the resolution was passed and supported by the majority of House Representatives despite Tlaib clarifying on the House floor that her criticism is targeted at the Israeli government, not the people. In the UK, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak condemned the slogan and called the people who use it either gravely misinformed or supportive of the threat that the slogan signifies towards Israel’s existence. Last year, Pro Palestine rallies across the UK were condemned by former Home Secretary Suella Braverman. She was of the opinion that the rallies were “hate marches” against Jewish people and the state of Israel, encouraging the police to use brute force with zero tolerance. Braverman has repeatedly expressed her contention with the rallies and the phrase asking why it has been justified under claims of religious struggle. She has also proposed to alter the Terrorism Act 2000 as in its current state, evidence of incitement and encouragement of terrorism is required to charge the protestors, calling for laws to tackle “mass extremism” on the UK streets. Individuals holding office encouraging the police to take strong action against protestors without distinguishing between peaceful and non-peaceful elements is deeply concerning as it paves the way for influencing and forming a collective narrative that eventually infiltrates the general public. The encouragement of violence against the protestors in itself comes off as a threat to people’s right to protest and freedom of expression; just as Rashida Tlaib’s clarification on her stance being against the Israeli government and not the people was ignored, condemning her pro-Palestine stance.

The pro-Palestine student protests taking place across university campuses have been labeled anti-semitic resulting in several students being arrested by the police. Upon being asked about the phrase being used, the Columbia University President pointed out that although she feels that the phrase is antisemitic, there are people who do not hold the same opinion. Since April 18, the arrests have taken place at 40 different US campuses resulting in more than 2100 students being arrested. The arrests and the administration’s sympathetic stance towards anti-protestors have widely challenged freedom of speech and expression where students are being penalized for voicing out their opinion and publicly protesting against a genocide. Such practices are discriminatory and promote a greater divide within the community. 

Censoring public opinions on platforms is not only an undemocratic practice but also sets a questionable global precedent where silencing the masses becomes an acceptable norm. Although drawing a clear binary between free speech and hate speech is important, institutions and government bodies need to demarcate through careful consideration. As mentioned earlier, the particular phrase under scrutiny is used during peaceful pro-Palestine protests to showcase solidarity with Palestinians and their struggles. It is more to sympathize with them than it is to acts of terror. As the binary is defined, it is important to remember that calling out states participating in genocide cannot and should not be categorized as hate speech let alone students being penalized for the same. Several universities including New York University and Columbia University have barred graduating students from attending their graduation ceremonies as a consequence of their participation in the protests. This has led the protesting students to create their own events under the name of “The People’s Graduation” to provide support to the barred students by celebrating their achievements together. In addition, faculty members have also come forward to protest and in support of the protesting students, the same can however not be said about university administrations. 

Beyond the right to protest, students and other migrants relocate to countries like the US and the UK to improve their quality of life which includes their right to stand up for and against different causes that resonate with their identities as an ethnic, religious, or social community. When influential countries take a draconian position that advocates for the suppression of free speech, in addition to alienating the victims, they invalidate the individual right to democratic expression and legitimize all forms of oppression citizens and marginalized groups face in authoritarian states. 

While the intended use of the phrase at large is to advocate for the freedom of Palestinians, some perceive it as a threat to a state. By censoring pro-Palestine content, big tech platforms play a role in the erasure of digital evidence against human rights atrocities in addition to curbing free speech online. At the state and educational institutions level, the opposition to the phrase emphasizes the increased suppression of marginalized communities and their voices. To ensure equitable justice and access to information on online platforms through content regulation, it is important to not engage in disproportionate assessment of certain cases. To maintain their global status, platforms need to ensure that the criteria to flag specific content should be gauged not in line with regulations within specific countries, for instance, the US or the UK as discussed above, but per global majority countries. 

January 16, 2024 - Comments Off on Digital Rights Foundation’s Conference on Countering Digital Threats and Building Resilience of Communities

Digital Rights Foundation’s Conference on Countering Digital Threats and Building Resilience of Communities

December 15, 2023

ISLAMABAD: Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) held a conference titled, ‘Countering Digital Threats and Building Resilience of Communities’ on Friday, 15th December 2023 in Islamabad. DRF’s conference addressed the lack of discourse relating to online freedoms in the country particularly with the rise of hate speech and disinformation against vulnerable and at-risk communities in Pakistan. The conference brought together experts from across the country with two panels that highlighted DRF’s engagements and redressal mechanisms available in the country for at-risk communities in Pakistan.

The event started off with welcome remarks by Seerat Khan Programs Lead at DRF in which she highlighted the particular vulnerabilities that religious minorities face in the country, especially with respect to rising hate speech and disinformation. Nighat Dad, Executive Director at Digital Rights Foundation also noted that “With the upcoming elections we see how harmful content pertaining to religious minorities in the country is increasing, particularly (the elements of) disinformation and hate speech. The rise in hate speech and disinformation will be even more rapid with the use of AI and generative AI which is quite concerning. The Election Commission and government institutions need to address this and include hate speech in the code of conduct for political parties that the Commission is developing. Social media platforms also need to do more to address how hate speech and disinformation spread and impact they have on at-risk communities in countries like Pakistan.”

In 2021, DRF conducted a research on "Religious Minorities in Online Spaces (2021)," addressing communities' vulnerabilities to attacks, disinformation campaigns, harassment, and hate speech. The research mapped the experiences of religious minorities in online spaces and through surveys and interviews, we found a majority of respondents for the aforementioned research experienced online negativity, including backlash or threats on the basis of religious affiliation and/or a combination of factors.

The first panel of the conference, ‘Navigating Digital Boundaries: Combating Online Hate Speech and Disinformation’ was a conversation about the challenges posed by online hate speech and disinformation targeting at-risk communities. The panel was moderated by Senior Program Manager Zainab Durrani and included NCHR Secretary Mr. Kamran Rajar, Dr. Shoaib Suddle, One Man Commission for Minorities, Academic Dr. Ayra Patras, Journalist Sajjad Azhar and Director of Bolo Bhi, Usama Khilji. The panelists shed light on how online hate speech and disinformation manifest online and how to combat these as a community together.

Dr. Ayra Patras said,”When religious minority communities are ostracized in real life then you see the replication of this behavior online as well. We see more hate speech and there are no recompense mechanisms in place that actually work.” She added,”The social discrimination faced by these communities germinates into social exclusion and the consequences are far-reaching and become entrenched in real life.

The second panel of the event was on ‘Bridging the Digital Divide: Ensuring Equal Access for All’ which was moderated by Programs Lead Seerat Khan. The panel was joined by NCHR Member Minorities Manzoor Masih, Former Senator Farahtullah Baber, Community Leader and Activist Sunil Gulzar Khan and Cyber Harassment Helpline Manager Hyra Basit. The panel addressed mechanisms needed to ensure safe spaces for at-risk communities, particularly in light of the upcoming elections and the need for community building and resilience.

Senator Farhatullah Babar said,”The discussion around digital divide is very timely in light of  the upcoming elections. In Pakistan, media has played a great role in elections and online disinformation is a very real issue.” He added,”It is very important to considers all actors complicit in the online disinformation campaign and more than most, its the state is complicit”. He advocated for the Election Commission of Pakistan to develop a code of conduct for media house that is focused on combating disinformation on social media.

Digital Rights Foundation is a registered research-based NGO in Pakistan. Founded in 2012, DRF focuses on ICTs to support human rights, inclusiveness, democratic processes, and digital governance. DRF works on issues of online free speech, privacy, data protection and online violence against women.
For more information log on: www.digitalrightsfoundation.pk

Facebook
Twitter/X
Instagram
Tiktok
#DigitalResilienceConference
Contact

Nighat Dad 
nighat@digitalrightsfoundation.pk

Seerat Khan
seerat@digitalrightsfoundation.pk

Anam Baloch
anam@digitalrightsfoundation.pk

August 10, 2023 - Comments Off on Creative Freedom vs. Societal Sensitivities: The Balancing Act in Entertainment Censorship

Creative Freedom vs. Societal Sensitivities: The Balancing Act in Entertainment Censorship

Rameen Durrani

Rameen Durrani is a student majoring in Economics & Political Science and is working as a Research & Policy Intern at Digital Rights Foundation for the summer of 2023.

Censorship of entertainment frequently occupies a fragile middle ground between artistic freedom and societal sensitivities. This dynamic is especially noticeable in Pakistan, where cultural, religious, and societal norms influence the boundaries of creative expression. In the context of Pakistani entertainment censorship, this blog explores the constant difficulty of striking the correct balance between creative freedom and societal sensitivity.

While Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, it also “allows for reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the "glory of Islam" or the "integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan" or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offense.” This provision, amongst others, creates ambiguity as to the degree of creative freedom within a country that has, for decades, been engaged in a battle of achieving modernity while also retaining its traditional values. According to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, “the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority (PEMRA) has been established under the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 to facilitate and regulate the private electronic media. It has the mandate to improve the standards of information, education and entertainment and to enlarge the choice available to the people of Pakistan, including news, current affairs, religious knowledge, art and culture as well as science and technology.[1]

Owing to its largely contradictory laws, the influence of religious groups and the absence of media literacy, censorship decisions in Pakistan have often stifled artistic expression and discouraged daring storytelling. In addition to frequent film censorship, platform bans have also become quite common. Movie database IMDB was blocked on the pretext of it containing a review and link to a documentary on Balochistan. In 2021, PEMRA also directed local television channels to "stop airing caress and hug scenes" in dramas, as it was receiving several complaints against such content.[2] It is interesting to note, however, that no such complaints are addressed regarding domestic violence as well as other forms of abuse that often serve as the main theme of various TV shows.

[1] Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. (MOIB), PAKISTAN. (n.d.).www.moib.gov.pk. http://www.moib.gov.pk/Pages/178/PEMRA

[2] In Pakistan, TV channels told to stop airing “hugging scenes” in dramas. WION. https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/in-pakistan-tv-channels-told-to-stop-airing-hugging-scenes-in-dramas-423167

Saim Sadiq’s Joyland,  Pakistan’s first-ever competitive entry at the Cannes Film Festival won the Jury Prize in the ‘Un Certain Regard’ category at the festival. Joyland was also shortlisted by Pakistan’s Oscars Selection Committee as the country’s submission to the 95th Academy Awards.[1] After bagging multiple awards on international platforms and receiving a 10-minute standing ovation at Cannes, the film was stopped from release in the very country it was representing globally. The Internet appeared to be divided after the Pakistani authorities banned Joyland on the grounds that written complaints had been received that the movie contains “highly objectionable material” that does not conform with the “social values and moral standards of our society.”[2] The film was later permitted to release after heavy censorship in all provinces except Punjab, on the grounds that they were ‘receiving complaints’ against the content.[3]

Actions like these raise questions about the apparent hypocrisy that is embedded in entertainment censorship in Pakistan as films like The Legend of Maula Jutt that portray extreme forms of violence and brutality are conveniently passed by the Censor Board while films like Joyland that highlight important and sensitive social issues are restricted. In fact, according to an Al-Jazeera article, when an objection over graphic violence in The Legend of Maula Jutt was raised before the release of the film, the Censor Board chairperson threatened: ‘If anyone cuts anything in this film, I’ll resign.”[1]

Similarly, in 2023, the film Javed Iqbal: The Untold Story Of A Serial Killer was banned two days before it was scheduled to be released. It was later allowed to be released under a different name and again after heavy censorship.[1] Most recently, the film Zindagi Tamasha directed by Sarmad Khoosat faced a challenging journey due to censorship in Pakistan.[2] Despite critical acclaim, the movie was banned by the government, leading to financial losses and limited audience reach. The ban on theatrical release denied the filmmakers the opportunity to earn revenue from box office collections, pushing them to release the film on YouTube for free. This unfortunate outcome underscores the adverse consequences of entertainment censorship in Pakistan, as it poses obstacles for filmmakers in pursuing their artistic vision.

So the question remains: who decides what is acceptable? PEMRA has been criticized for being overly sensitive to religious and cultural issues, leading to the banning or editing of content that may not be objectively offensive but merely challenges conservative norms. This approach is seen as stifling creative freedom and hindering the growth of a diverse and inclusive media landscape. Moreover, it has led to a drastic increase in self-censorship as content creators self-censor to avoid offending or hurting the sentiments of certain groups, as they fear facing public outrage or even threats. In an interview with Samaa News, Javed Iqbal’s director Abu Aleeha stated, “My cinema is not commercial. I can’t show characters singing and dancing. I try not to show abuse and nudity, but if I am making a film on Javed Iqbal, who killed 100 children, then portraying him to be someone other than what he was would be unconvincing to the audience. I have to show reality.” [1]

[1] “Joyland” is Pakistan’s entry for Oscars 2023. (2022, September 30). The Express Tribune. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2379352/joyland-is-pakistans-entry-for-oscars-2023

[1] Saifi, T. S. (2022, November 16). Pakistan blocks national release of “Joyland,” a story of sexual liberation. CNN.

[1] Joyland film: notices issued to Punjab govt, censor board against ban. (2022, November 30). Bol News. https://www.bolnews.com/pakistan/2022/11/joyland-film-notices-issued-to-punjab-censor-board-against-ban/

[1] Sharma, S. (2022, October 22). Pakistani film The Legend of Maula Jatt sets a new benchmark. Www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved August 7, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/10/22/the-return-of-maula-jatt

[1] Khan, A. (2023, March 27). Name of Pakistani film “Javed Iqbal” changed, resubmitted to censor board for approval. FactFile. https://factfile.pk/2023/03/27/name-of-pakistani-film-javed-iqbal-changed-resubmitted-to-censor-board-for-approval

[1] https://tribune.com.pk/author/328. (2023, August 3). “Zindagi Tamasha” to release on YouTube, Vimeo. The Express Tribune. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2429079/sarmad-khoosats-passion-project-zindagi-tamasha-to-release-on-youtube-vimeo

 

While it is true that petitions to ban certain entertainment content in Pakistan often come from the public, it is important to understand that the majority's viewpoint is not always indicative of what is best for a constitutional democratic society. The public's concerns should not be disregarded outright, but decisions regarding entertainment censorship must be made through a careful and balanced process that considers various factors, such as the right to information and freedom of expression as well as the consequences of violating them. By taking certain considerations into account, Pakistan can navigate the complexities of entertainment censorship while upholding its socio-cultural and religious values. Like many other institutions, PEMRA also suffers from politicization and a lack of independence. Therefore, the need of the hour is to establish an independent and impartial body to oversee censorship decisions that target censorship efforts towards areas of genuine concern, such as hate speech, incitement to violence, and sexual abuse, rather than imposing outright bans on content that might stifle creative expression unnecessarily. In fact, the authorities need to define these categories in a way that there is a clear distinction between content that serves an educational purpose and content that propagates harmful ideals. PEMRA's inability to differentiate between the two raises concerns about the potential hindrance to fostering informed discussions and societal awareness.

With the world moving towards creating more inclusive and accepting societies, Pakistan appears to be heading in the opposite direction, as excessive censorship decelerates social progress and points towards an unaware and ignorant society. This restriction on information access can lead to uninformed decision-making by citizens, undermining the essence of democracy. Moreover, censorship's potential for abuse of power, coupled with media self-censorship, threatens media independence, minimizing the public's ability to hold those in power accountable. Additionally, it denies citizens the right to make their own choices about the content they consume by disregarding individual autonomy. To foster a vibrant and inclusive society, it is essential for Pakistan to strike a balance between the legitimate concerns of censorship and the preservation of freedom of expression and cultural diversity. Balancing creative freedom and societal sensitivities in a fairly traditional society like Pakistan requires a thoughtful and nuanced approach. Creating a space for dialogue between artists, filmmakers, religious leaders, policymakers, and the general public can help bridge the gap between creative expression and societal sensitivities, leading to better mutual understanding.

[1] Shahid, U. (2021, November 28). An uncensored history of film censorship in Pakistan. Samaa. https://www.samaaenglish.tv/news/2464853

April 12, 2023 - Comments Off on NADRA launches ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ Service

NADRA launches ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ Service

Author: Zainab Durrani
Program Manager

One of the latest developments shared by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is the new data protection service rolled out by them called ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ (‘With Your Consent’). Though limited information is available online regarding the initiative, we have gleaned the following from various sources:

How it works: Since March 2nd 2023, as per news reports covering NADRA’s public release, all national identity-related data acquisition of citizens will be accompanied by a 6-digit code authentication process to verify their consent in all service transactions. 

It is important to note that the NADRA database encompasses the biometric data of ‘125 million unique identities’ as per its own admission, labeling it as the ‘world’s largest singular citizen database,’ holding sensitive data including biometric personal information. The accompanying onus thus falls much more heavily on the Authority to provide safe systems to curtail data breaches, especially in the absence of data protection regulations in the country.

Although the details are not available on NADRA’s website, the news coverage states that the service has been put into motion and will accompany the use of a one-time password (OTP) to collect the authorization of the individual before verification of their Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC).

This development safeguarding the rights of Pakistani citizens in digital spaces, especially through data privacy, is a positive first step and one that must be accompanied by the principles of transparency and accountability. NADRA’s previous record as a data retainer and processor is unfortunately rife with several instances of data breaches.

When we at DRF attempted to register for the service, by sending a 13-digit CNIC number to 8009, a confirmation message was received almost instantaneously stating that the phone number was indeed linked to the CNIC in question, however, no more details were provided regarding the ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service itself.

Since the publicly available information was limited, we shared our queries with NADRA and encouragingly, received responses. The exchange is shared verbatim for our readers:

Question: How many citizens (and what percentage of the total citizens on the database) have signed up for the ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service so far? What efforts are being made to ensure all citizens sign up?

Response: ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service is a backend dynamic service. It doesn’t require any pre-registration. Instead at the time of verification, it generates a verification pass and sends it to the citizen on his/her recently reported mobile number. At the same time this service allows citizens to pair their default number to receive verification code. So far over a million citizens have paired their number to receive the code.’

Question: What checks are in place to ensure that NADRA will be sending the OTP for every CNIC-related transaction?

Response: ‘Data privacy and consent management is a fairly new idea in Pakistan therefore it needs to be rolled out gradually for its acceptance and minimize resistance. Therefore, it is planned to be rolled out in phases. The first phase was rolled out earlier this year and over 250 entities were moved to ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service. We receive feedback and adjust the service so that the verifying agencies are involved and made part of the system. After gradual rollout, eventually the plan is to ensure that every CNIC related transaction has the consent of the citizen. It may be a verification code, biometric verification or any other means that the organization may find appropriate in coming times.’

Question: What efforts, if any, are in place to ensure transparency in this process? Has NADRA considered instituting a live counter or roster hosted on the NADRA’s website, which can boost confidence in the Authority’s claim to added privacy protection?

Response: ‘As mentioned above, it is a gradual process. First challenge is to get the [sic] acceptance and introduce the consent management regime. As the whole system is automated and there are strict control measures and audit trails available to trace back any irregularity. NADRA takes data misuse [as] a very serious crime and take[s] strict action against the offenders.’

Question: Which transactions will be covered under this service, financial, retail, e-commerce?

Response: ‘Consent management is a universal phenomenon and all CNIC related transactions will be covered. Its rollout is gradual but eventually the whole industry will adopt this regime.’

While the answers provided by NADRA, helped clarify some of the broader details of  the service, left a few of our concerns unaddressed. We believe it would be prudent that NADRA lays out a step-by-step guide to clarify the registration process, to increase accessibility. NADRA shared a video they developed with us that accomplishes just that; sharing this video widely through social media and TV channels would help bolster registration. The link to NADRA’s video on ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service is available here

We are also concerned by the lack of specificity around the ‘strict control measures and audit trails’ and whether these audits will be available to the public. Additionally, more information on which entities have been moved to the ‘Ijazat Ap Ki’ service roster and generally applying a more forthcoming approach would be a welcome step in progressing towards a nation more in line with open governance principles. 

Another move that could bolster confidence in the Authority’s progress with regards to a citizen-centric vision would be the development of SOPs or perhaps a policy that quantifies and operationalises the ‘consent management regime’ that NADRA referred to in their responses. 

We would like to reiterate the need for a data protection instrument to oversee the regulation of data subject privacy is greater now than ever. Such a law would also be beneficial in institutionalizing changes that require public and private data processors, such as NADRA and the telecom and ISP sector to implement coherent privacy policies across the board. An overhaul of the existing perspective and strategy is required for Pakistan to keep up with the pace at which its citizens are adapting to digital lives.

Regardless, as a digital rights organization, we appreciate the commendable move to institute safeguards to further protect the vulnerable data of citizens and will continue to monitor the developments under this new service and the overall state of privacy in the country. 

https://www.geo.tv/latest/473813-nadra-rolls-out-pakistans-first-data-protection-service

https://www.nadra.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Corporate-Brochure-11.4.16.pdf

https://www.dawn.com/news/1660199

 

September 29, 2021 - Comments Off on Evaluating Applications Developed by the Pakistani Government

Evaluating Applications Developed by the Pakistani Government

Faizan Ul Haq is currently a Senior at LUMS majoring in History. His interests include tech, philosophy, and social justice

A non-exhaustive database of mobile phone applications developed by the Pakistani government has been compiled by Faizan and can be accessed here.

It has been widely noted that Pakistan’s potential for IT development has grown vastly in the last decade or so. According to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority’s Annual Report for 2019-2020, in the period from 2016 to 2020, Mobile phone data usage in Pakistan has increased from 614 petabytes to 4,498 – an increase of over 700% in just half a decade. In the same time period, the distribution of broadband services has doubled. While numerous reasons can be speculated for leading this change (from the availability of cheaper smartphones from Chinese providers like Q-Mobile and Huawei, to the increasing importance of IT in business development, and the proliferation of mobile internet), it is obvious either way that the digital world in Pakistan now presents a new avenue that can be harnessed for better governance and delivering services.

It makes sense, then, that in late 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurated the “Digital Pakistan” initiative. In its policy objectives, what stands out is the emphasis towards using digital applications (henceforth referred to as apps) for “e-governance” and in “key socio-economic sectors”. While there have been a few apps released previously to help with the aforementioned, the current government is seems intent on maximizing this newfound potential.

Over a 100 different apps (as of the summer 2021) have been released on the Google Playstore for Android phones and the Apple store for iOS device by both the government, at the provincial, federal and, at times, the district level. Primarily developed by different provincial IT boards, they cover a wide range of functions including education, the regulation of pre-existing government bodies, agriculture, and online ticketing and booking. Some apps are meant only for citizens of a particular locale (such as the City Islamabad app), while others are targeted to people of a specific profession (the Lahore and Sindh High Court apps are targeted towards the legal community). A few apps have also been released to help deal with health and safety emergencies, such as the Baytee app meant to increase women’s safety and a number of apps aimed at helping track and register COVID cases in Pakistan.

However, just publishing apps does not immediately mean that those apps have helped fix the underlying issues, or that they have been effective in their stated objectives. Quite a few of these apps have dubious efficacy, and some appear to not work at all. There are a few clear trends as to which apps have worked and which have not.

A number of apps profess a wide range of features. The “City Islamabad” app promises a lot. With the goal of “bridge(ing) the gap between citizens and government” by removing the need to go to government offices to access public services and departments, the app is supposed to provide quick access to numerous forms and payment services that would otherwise would have only been available therein. In practice, the Playstore review page is full of complaints that not all of the forms actually work. People have pointed out that tokens generated aren’t always registered by relevant financial departments. Certain forms load indefinitely – either they have not been programmed in properly, or the forms just are not available on the app. At the same time though, certain key features of the app still work and function effectively. The part of the app that provides information on Islamabad’s major landmarks and public facilities loads instantly and provides accurate information, while a portion of the userbase reports successful payment of tax related tokens and response upon submitting complaints. It appears that while a wide number of features have been programmed in, not all of them are perfectly useable.

A similar issue exists with what is arguably the government’s flagship application, the Pakistan Citizen Portal. Most of the reviews posted in September and August 2021 are entirely negative and allude largely to the same issue: a large number of the complaints registered on the app do not actually appear to lead to anything concrete and are instead marked “resolved” without any appropriate action being taken. While this is likely not representative of all users who have used the app, it does imply a degree of miscoordination between the app’s complaint registration mechanism and the departments that are meant to cater to it. If it’s true that complaints being marked as resolved does not actually mean any action has been taken, the widely quoted  statistics on the application’s website need to be taken with a grain of salt, it’s unlikely that each of the 3.1 million . It also speaks to the limitations inherent in e-governance and service delivery through apps – the issues that are already present in government bodies are likely to be reproduced through the functioning of the app. For example, if government bodies continue to treat cases of harassment lightly because of misogynistic attitudes, then the solution lies in a structural reform of said government bodies instead of opening more digital portals to file complaints through.

On the contrary, apps that are targeted towards a specific group of people appear to have had more success. There are two broad types of apps like this: some that have been created solely for the use of people in certain government departments, and others for everyone who works in a particular profession. Apps in the former category include the “Price Magistrate” app – a complaint management app meant specifically for district magistrates. This app has seen less use compared to other apps on this list, and its review section is full of users confused at the lack of a registration option. Of the few reviews that do appear to be from its intended user base, it seems that the app functions well.

An app’s functionality however is not just defined by how well certain features work. Overtime, as more bugs are reported, new devices are released and as operating systems go through several iterations, the publisher needs to provide constant support through updates to ensure their functionality. This is especially important in Pakistan, where Android users are likely to be using a very diverse set of devices given the numerous smartphone companies that exist. Additionally, smartphones in different price ranges have specific limitations – differences in screen resolution, RAM, processing power, and networking features mean that developers need to ensure that their apps can work despite these limitations. If this diversity isn’t catered for, sections of the Pakistani population that can only afford cheap smartphones with weaker specifications are likely to be left out. This means that the demographic which is least likely to be digitally literate will now also face bugs and compatibility issues that make it harder for them to use these applications. Updates are also important to address any security issues on the app, most application updates are issued to fix security bugs that are discovered later on and unanticipated backdoors.

The most prolific publisher of Government apps thus far has been the Punjab IT Board (compared to the other regional boards and other publishers, who barely have half as many apps as the Punjab board between them). On their Android publisher page alone, they have over 70 apps published. Yet, their support for these apps has been sporadic. More than half of these have not been updated even once in 2021. While at best, this might lead to most of these apps functioning albeit with bugs, quite a few of them have been rendered completely unusable as a result. A large number of users report that quite a few of these apps no longer have a working system for logging in users owing to an issue in generating and processing an OTP key. Other apps have been rendered completely unusable – the Agri-Smart app has been rendered completely unusable for certain Android users since their devices’ IMEI codes cannot be accessed. These issues have remained unaddressed for months on end.

It is unclear what the status of these apps is – if such glaring issues exist, has support for them been dropped completely? This seems to be the case, because other apps have had the publisher release frequent updates and engage with reviews that have pointed out issues. The fact that these apps remain available for download despite issues with their usability and a lack of developer support is troubling and speaks to a pattern where apps are launched without the necessary infrastructure to conduct follow-ups. This has caused a fair amount of confusion on app stores, as people continue to download said apps and leave negative reviews because of the clear lack of functionality.

If this is demonstrative of a communication gap between app developers and the intended user base, it is not the end of it. Certain apps certainly seem like they are designed to be used by a large user base, but evidently have not been used as such. The Click ECP app meant to facilitate voters during each election cycle and the Covid-19 Tracker app for Lahore both remain with only over a 1000+ downloads on the Playstore, when it is intuitive that their usage numbers should be far in the thousands. The “Equal Access App” meant to help disabled individuals also remains unused as its user base still is unengaged. At best, this is likely to result in certain apps being unused by their target demographic. At worst though, this can open the door to privacy violations.

Upon first use, a lot of apps require permission to access certain information and features of a phone. While this can vary from app to app, the general rule of thumb is that apps tend to only ask for those permissions that are core to an app’s functionality. Instagram, for example, will only ask for permission to use your camera when you open the in-app camera for the first time. However, even this can run awry – the Facebook app has long been under suspicion for secretly recording conversations for advertisement purposes. A number of apps supported by the Pakistan government, however, ask for a lot of permissions right at first launch. The Pehchaan app (currently unavailable on the Playstore as of September 2021) immediately requests permission to access a user’s location on launch. The “Forest Management Information System” (FMIS) app requests not only access to location services, but also to use the phone’s camera, to “modify and delete contents” of media files saved on device or USB storage, and of Wi-Fi connections. Why the app requires any of this is puzzling, especially since there is no use for any of these features immediately after an app has been launched. This runs afoul of the Principle of Data Minimization – the idea that data collectors should only request and use data that is needed for a specific purpose. Ideally, that purpose should be communicated clearly and a privacy policy should be attached in any scenario where private data is needed. Given that there is little communication from the developers of why these permissions are needed in the first place, it’s extremely troubling that many people in Pakistan could agree to these permissions just to launch an app without realizing the extent to which their privacy is invaded. While Google Play store does include a requirement that each app have a privacy policy attached, the Punjab IT Board’s Privacy Policy seems inadequate. The fact that it’s a generic policy means that it does not cater to the way each individual app may request, use, and store user data. By contrast, the City Islamabad App’s privacy policy and the Pakistan Citizens Portal’s privacy policy at least both specify the kind of data that may be collected. The Punjab IT Board’s privacy policy might already be violated by the FMIS collecting the “the minimum amount of information” required by the app. It is clear that the Punjab IT Board’s privacy policy – under which most of the apps released so far fall under – can be comprehensive and applied more rigorously.

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the Digital Pakistan initiative is worth questioning. Despite the massive growth in Pakistan’s access to these digital technologies and the potential therein, the system put in place to actualize it deserves further scrutiny. The reception of apps published by the government needs to move beyond a tokenistic celebration of each app’s release, to an evaluation of their actual benefit and long-term functioning.